

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP



DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO NATIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMME SUPPORT PROJECT (PANPURC)

PROJECT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORT (PPER)

**OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT (OPEV)
PROJECTS AND PROGRAMMES EVALUATION DIVISION (OPEV.1)**

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Currency Equivalents

At Appraisal (July 2001)	At PCR Preparation (December 2006)	At Post-Evaluation October 2009
Currency = Congolese Franc UA 1 = SDR 1 UA 1 = USD 1.26065	Currency = Congolese Franc UA 1=SDR 1 UA 1 = USD 1.45029	Currency = Congolese Franc UA 1=SDR 1 UA 1 = USD 1.58437

Exchange Rate Trend

Period	Exchange Rate UA/CDF (annual averages)
2003	424.234416
2004	572.930916
2005	688.8285 (October)
December 2006	665.214
October 2009	1200.4973

Weights and Measures

Metric System

Fiscal Year

1 January - 31 December

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ABEDA	: Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
ACBF	: African Capacity Building Foundation
ADB	: African Development Bank
ADF	: African Development Fund
AFRITAC	: African Regional Technical Assistance Centre
BCC	: Central Bank of Congo
BCEAO	: Central Bank of West African States
BCECO	: Central Public Projects Coordination Agency
BCMP	: <i>Bourse Congolaise des Matières Premières</i> (Congolese commodity exchange)
BD	: Bidding Documents
BWI	: Bretton Woods Institutions
CIDA	: Canadian International Development Agency
CPA	: Country Performance Assessment
CPIA	: Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
CSP	: Country Strategy Paper
CTCPM	: Technical Unit for Mining Coordination and Planning
DDR	: Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration
DMFAS	: Debt Management and Financial Analysis System
DRC	: Democratic Republic of Congo
EU	: European Union
FE	: Foreign Exchange
FSF	: Fragile States Facility
FSS	: Fragile States Strategy
GDP	: Gross Domestic Product

GPRSP	: Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
HIPC	: Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HIPCI	: Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
HIV/AIDS	: Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ICB	: International Competitive Bidding
ICT	: Information and Communication Technologies
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
INS	: National Institute of Statistics
I-PRSP	: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
LC	: Local currency
MDG	: Millennium Development Goals
MDRP	: Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
MONUC	: United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
NEPAD	: New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	: Non-Governmental Organisation
ODA	: Official Development Assistance
OGEDEP	: Public Debt Management Office
PAIM	: Multi-Sector Institutional Support Project
PANPURC	: National Capacity Building Programme Support Project
PARER	: Economic Recovery and Reunification Support Programme
PASE	: Education Sector Support Project
PBA	: Performance-Based Allocation
PCR	: Project Completion Report
PD	: Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
PMPTR	: Minimum Partnership Programme for Transition and Recovery
PMURR	: Emergency Multi-sector Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme
PNRC	: National Capacity Building Programme
PNURC	: National Emergency Programme for Capacity Building
PPER	: Project Performance Evaluation Report
PRGF	: Growth and Poverty Reduction Facility
PRONAREC	: National Capacity Building Programme
PRSP	: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSC	: Programme Steering Committee
SDR	: Special Drawing Rights
SENAREC	: National Capacity Building Secretariat
SMP	: Staff Monitoring Program
SNA	: System of National Accounts
TAF	: Technical Assistance Fund
UA	: Unit of Account
UNCTAD	: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	: United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USD	: United States Dollar
WB	: World Bank
WFP	: World Food Programme

DRC/PANPURC BASIC PROJECT DATA

Preliminary Data

Country : Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
 Project : National Capacity Building Programme Support Project (PANPURC)
 Project Code : P-ZR-KF06-0013
 Grant Number : 2100155000049
 Recipient : DRC Government
 Beneficiary : DRC Government
 Executing Agency: National Capacity Building Secretariat (SENAREC)

A. Grant Data

	Estimate	Actual
Grant Amount (in UA million)	1.97	1.64
Grant Approval Date	June 2001	20/06/2001
Grant Signature Date	July 2001	18/07/2001
Effectiveness Date	November 2001	18/10/2001
Completion Date	31/12/2003	30/6/2006

B. Project/Programme Data

Financing Plan

Estimate (UA million equivalent)					Actual (UA million equivalent)			
Source	FE	LC	Total	%	FE	LC	Total	%
TAF/ADB	1.16	0.81	1.97	72.2	1.62	0.02	1.64	68.3
CIDA	0.30	-	0.30	11.0	0.30	-	0.30	12.5
Government		0.46	0.46	16.8		0.46	0.46	19.2
Total	1.46	1.27	2.73	100	1.92	0.48	2.40	100

	Estimate	Actual
Date of First Disbursement	2002	10/6/2002
Date of Last Disbursement	2003	2006

C. Implementation of Performance Indicators

Cost Overrun/Under-estimation (including TAF representing grant balance as at 30 June 2006)	<u>UA -0.33million</u> (UA -0.33million)	- 12% (-16.8%)
Time Overrun/Advance on Schedule at Appraisal	30 months	
- Slippage on Effectiveness	1 month	
- Slippage on First Disbursement	6 months	
- Slippage on Completion Date anticipated at		

Appraisal	30 months	
Number of Extensions of Last Disbursement	3	
Project Implementation Status	Completed on 30 June 2006	
5. List of Verifiable Indicators and Levels of Achievement (in % levels planned) by Component	Actual amount in million USD UA	Actual/ Estimate
Technical Assistance	0.534 0.411	101%
Equipment	0.900 0.692	87%
Training	0.764 0.280	98%
Operations	0.555 0.427	132%
Audit	0.040 0.031	100%

D. Missions

Types of Mission	Dates	No. of Persons	Composition		Person/ Days
			Economists	Consultants	
1. Identification	June 1999		Multi-Agency Dialogue Mission		
2. Preparation	November 1999				
3. Appraisal	Feb.2000 and Jan. 2001				
4. Supervisions					
Supervision 1	18 July to 3 August 2002	1	1		1P/16d
Supervision 2	7 to 18 February 2003	1	1		1P/12d
Supervision 3	11 to 22 November 2003	1	1		1P/11d
Supervision 4 (Mid-Term)	4 to 18 May 2004	1	1		1P/14d
Supervision 5	9 to 16 December 2004	1	1		1P/7d
Supervision 6	17 to 24 November 2005	1	1		1P/7d
Annual Audit of Accounts (external)	10/7/2002, 31/12/2003 and 2004				
5. Completion	6 to 19 December 2006	2	1	1	2P/18d
6. Post-Evaluation	19 to 29 October 2009	3	2	1	3P/21d

E. Annual Disbursements (UA million equivalent)

Years	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total at 30/06/2006
Disbursements Planned	1.48	0.49	-	-	-	1.97
Actual Disbursements for entire Project Financing	0.024	1.727	-	0.559	0.08	2.39
Balance on Grant	1.456					0.330

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The Project: *Project Objectives and Scope at Appraisal*

1.1 This Project Performance Evaluation Report (PPER) covers the Project to support the DRC's National Capacity Building Programme t (PANPURC), approved in June 2001 and completed in 2006, which contributed to the implementation of the National Emergency Capacity Building Programme (PNURC), adopted in 1999 by the Government. At appraisal, PANPURC fitted into the political and economic context of the late 1990s, marked by the continuing civil war but also by the start of the peace process. Against this background, no reconstruction project could be effective without capacity building. PANPURC is still relevant today as the DRC, having emerged from a post-crisis situation, remains a fragile State experiencing gradual improvement, but characterized by one of the lowest human development indicators in the world.

1.2 The ultimate goal of the project was to build national development management capacity. In the medium-term, PANPURC was expected to have the intermediate outcome of improved national capacity in coordination and in macroeconomic and sector management. The direct expected outcomes were: (i) improved reliability of monetary and banking statistics, (ii) improved debt management, (iii) preparation of the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRSP) using a participatory approach and (iv) a strengthened institutional framework for policy and reform coordination. The Bank's efforts to build capacity in the DRC continued through subsequent projects such as the Economic Recovery and Reunification Support Programme Institutional Support Project (PARER, 2003-2006), the Multi-Sector Institutional Support Project (PAIM, 2002-2009), and other projects with a capacity building component. Lastly, the Bank has been requested to provide support to the Government as part of the National Public Administration Capacity Building and Modernisation Programme (PRONAREC, 2011-15).

2 Implementation Performance

2.1 The ADF grant to support PANPURC (UA 1.64 million at completion) was disbursed in four tranches between 2002 and 2006. SENAREC prepared progress reports on a regular basis. Project activities were completed 30 months behind schedule. The delay stemmed from several factors including SENAREC's initial poor knowledge of Bank procedures as it had not received any training at the inception of the project, the slowness of the Bank and the Government in processing project files and the country's security and political situation.

3 Key Post-Evaluation Findings

3.1 *Relevance of Objectives and Quality at Entry.* PANPURC derived its relevance from its compliance and consistency with the DRC's various development programmes and strategies for the period concerned, such as PNURC, I-PRSP 2002-05 and GPRSP 2006-08. Its sector goal and specific objectives were in line with the main aspects of two of the three PNURC components as well as Pillar 1 of the GPRSP. It was also consistent with the main thrusts of the Bank's CSP for the period. Its approach was also in keeping with the approach adopted recently in CSP 2008-12 and the capacity building component of the Bank's Strategy for Fragile States in 2008. By targeting actions to be undertaken and the institutions to benefit from capacity building, the Bank, through a grant, responded appropriately to the country's needs, given the resources available. The project quality at entry is

deemed satisfactory. The project's logical framework matrix defined the PANPURC objectives and outputs fairly accurately, but did not contain enough monitoring indicators.

3.2 *Achievement of Objectives and Outcomes (Efficacy)*. The project achieved the immediate (short-term) and intermediate (indirect) expected outcomes for: (i) improved reliability of monetary and banking statistics; (ii) improved debt management; (iii) preparation of a PRSP using a participatory process; (iv) a strengthened institutional framework for reform and policy coordination and (v) improved national coordination and macroeconomic management capacity.

3.3 The project, as expected, contributed to improving the reliability of the BCC's financial statistics, by providing computer hardware and training. Financial statistics that previously were provided in three months are now available within a week or two. It also allowed the automation of financial information and revived financial intermediation supervision. Further efforts are needed for the production and dissemination of statistics, particularly with regard to economic accounts, the Government financial operations table and the balance of payments.

3.4 In terms of debt management, the project allowed OGEDEP to set up a computerized database on debt, which in itself was a huge step forward, compared to the manual processing previously conducted. This database is updated continually and has captured 95% of the external debt. Indicators and publications on debt have improved. It has allowed OGEDEP to ensure faster and more timely data delivery and to improve publications on debt management. OGEDEP's opinion is increasingly sought on the issue of public debt. However, there are still some deficiencies in the transmission of debt service data by the agencies responsible for disbursements or executing payment orders. The DMFAS system's compatibility with the databases of the Ministry of Finance and the BCC needs to be improved. Furthermore, the DMFAS hardware and software are becoming obsolete.

3.5 PANPURC contributed significantly to the preparation of the GPRSP, by conducting seven thematic studies and providing training and equipment to the various entities responsible for those studies. The studies are still useful for policy work and sector planning.

3.6 The institutional framework for policy and reforms coordination was strengthened through the measures taken with respect to BCC and SENAREC, as well as the central coordinating departments of the economic ministries and four technical secretariats of the Inter-ministerial Committees. SENAREC was closely involved in institutional building, both as the managing agency of PANPURC and the government agency that prepared PNURC and subsequent programmes.

3.7 The results achieved by the project through its components helped improve national coordination and macroeconomic management capacity in those post-conflict and transitional phases. As a result, the formulation and implementation of government macroeconomic policies were revived. Various programmes were thus concluded with IMF, and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) were also prepared. Several programmes developed as part of the implementation of these strategies served as frameworks for intervention by development partners during the emergency and transitional phases.

3.8 The project also contributed to the ultimate goal of improving the country's development management capacity. However, further efforts are still necessary to significantly improve the quality of

the country's economic programmes and governance, whose deficiencies are reflected in the ratings of the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) system and other economic and financial governance indicators.

3.9 *Efficiency.* The positive outcomes observed were obtained in a management context characterized by the doubling of the implementation period (30 months slippage on the original completion date), irregular disbursements and a negative cost variation of 12%. The delay in project implementation stemmed partly from the Congolese Administration's poor knowledge of the Bank's procedures that resulted in submission of incomplete disbursement and bidding documents as well as the Bank's slowness in processing documents. The efficiency of the project is deemed unsatisfactory.

3.10 *Institutional Development.* PANPURC had a satisfactory impact on the country's institutional development, particularly through the capacity building of BCC in financial intermediation, OGEDEP in debt management, SENAREC in capacity building and other central economic agencies (inter-ministerial coordinating committee, central directorates of ministries) in programme formulation. Changes occurred in the procedures and practices of these agencies and in their ability to deliver expected outputs. The working relations of BCC and OGEDEP with Government departments and development partners were further developed. SENAREC's institutional position has been reaffirmed and its role as facilitator of capacity building actions confirmed.

3.11 *Sustainability.* The sustainability of PANPURC's impact appears probable, given the strengthening of BCC, OGEDEP and SENAREC, to enable them optimally design, plan and undertake capacity-building actions, and also considering these entities' past and present commitments to provide more quality services. Other factors boding for sustainability are the Government's commitment to capacity building and the development partners' constant support to DRC as a fragile State. However, this sustainability is threatened by the lack of financial resources (except in the case of BCC), gaps in the training actions, which were too isolated (ad hoc) and IT-related constraints stemming from the unreliability of the electricity and IT networks and maintenance deficiencies.

3.12 The aggregate performance of PANPURC is considered satisfactory.

3.13 *Borrower's Performance.* The Government was greatly involved in the preparation and implementation of PANPURC. The various documents prepared under its responsibility, such as PNURC, I-PRSP or GPRSP, provided a framework for PANPURC and other programmes financed by development partners. The Donee made institutional arrangements for the implementation of PANPURC, particularly strengthening SENAREC, and overall implemented it satisfactorily. The technical assistance provided with Bank support was generally put to good use mainly because of the availability of national counterparts. SENAREC, confirmed in its role of coordinating capacity building, is about to launch PRONAREC. Despite the doubling of the project implementation period, and the implementation delays, the Borrower's performance is deemed satisfactory.

3.14 *Bank's Performance.* At the preparation and appraisal stages, the Bank worked in close coordination with the Government development partners and took into account, based on the resources available, the urgent capacity building needs of the public administration. Its contribution, at a crucial period for the country, particularly through the introduction of IT tools was instrumental in modernising public service management and revitalising the country's economic administration. The Bank's

assistance in support of capacity building in the DRC was provided to ensure the continuity of actions and underpinned the launching of the vast capacity building programme. However, the Bank was late in organising the initial training for the project managers and too often slow in processing documents submitted by the Donee. Overall, the Bank's performance is considered satisfactory.

4 Conclusions

4.1 Despite a difficult national post-conflict context, marked by the weak capacity of national institutions and the fact that capacity building efforts in Africa have not always been as effective as expected, the project is considered a success story. This success stems from sound project design and implementation but also from real ownership by the beneficiary entities, despite the delay in implementation time.

4.2 PANPURC responded satisfactorily to the Government's main concern, which was to contribute to capacity building, as part of PNURC, in order to develop minimum capacity for the resumption of fruitful cooperation with development partners, prepare and implement reconstruction programmes and revive the economy. A fragile State, the DRC has moved from a post-conflict phase to that of gradual improvement through a Government-led consolidation process, with support from development partners.

4.3 The project has played a pioneering role in modernising the macroeconomic management structures of the DRC. The results obtained are satisfactory in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and institutional development, particularly with regard to debt management, improving financial statistics and preparing GPRSP 2006-08. These positive results were made possible through the effective targeting of actions by the project and the beneficiary structures. National macroeconomic management capacity improved, albeit to a limited extent. Therefore, significant efforts are still required to improve the quality of the country's programmes and economic governance.

4.4 Even though the sustainability of the project's outcomes is likely, it is affected by the weaknesses observed in equipment maintenance, inadequate ICT infrastructure, the lack of a long-term approach to training and insufficient consideration of decentralisation as enshrined in the Constitution. The commitment of the different stakeholders is likely to help overcome these difficulties.

5 Key Lessons and Recommendations

5.1 Key Lessons

- i. The success of capacity-building projects depends on clear objectives that are based on a sound analysis of the baseline situation and the country's needs and targeting the right institutions and systems to be strengthened.
- ii. The involvement of the beneficiary structures from project inception, particularly in the identification of needs, encourages ownership, coverage of recurrent expenditure and continuity of capacity building activities beyond the project.
- iii. An effective programme for building capacity in the public administration must form part of a long-term vision based on the reorganisation of an effective and results-oriented

administration that takes into account the needs of decentralisation and is underpinned by measures to increase public officials' awareness of their responsibilities, institution of accountability and a culture of monitoring/ evaluation of results and performance.

- iv. In fragile states, public administration capacity building cannot be limited solely to training and the transfer of skills and equipment. It will require putting in place incentive structures and the motivation needed to bring about behaviour change among key actors to support the rehabilitation potential of the administrative structure.
- v. The establishment of a national capacity building coordination agency, through budget support and an integrated ODA programming platform is a major asset for undertaking the restructuring of the public services of a fragile State.

5.2 Key Recommendations

For the Government

- i. Develop a long-term vision for building capacity in the public administration, which should be run using a results-based approach, fully taking into consideration the decentralisation enshrined in the Constitution, which PRONAREC will be part of.
- ii. Capacity building involves training and the provision of equipment over the long-term as well as changes in institutional rules and organisational systems, including appropriate and motivating human resource management and remuneration policies.
- iii. Spur modernisation of the public administration, by focusing on computerization and setting up data transmission networks as part of a national strategy for ICT development, which can be prepared and implemented with Bank support.
- iv. Move forward with decentralisation and strengthen local capacity while taking due account of the considerable weakness in local resources, especially in areas such as statistics, studies, planning, computerization and communication networks. In this regard, it is important to develop more national training programmes in the area of capacity building in coordination and macroeconomic management to support local administrations.
- v. Promote the coordination, ownership, alignment and harmonisation of development partners' capacity building interventions, and establish an integrated ODA programming platform, with appropriate leadership.
- vi. Ensure the institutional viability of SENAREC as a national capacity building coordination structure in order to implement the ambitious national public administration modernisation programme, PRONAREC, which is being finalised.

For the Bank

- vii. Support the Government's decentralisation efforts, particularly in building local capacity in statistics, studies and planning as well as in access to IT networks.
- viii. In keeping with the FSF¹ objectives regarding knowledge building and management, use the resources of the Targeted Support Window to conduct Economic and Sector Work (ESW) on the various dimensions of the DRC's fragility, reconstruction and development.
- ix. Support modernisation of the public administration by providing assistance for computerization support for preparation and implementation by the Government of an ICT development strategy.
- x. Support the Government in providing, at the national and local levels, training in management and planning to assist local institutions whose role has been strengthened as part of decentralisation.

¹ The Boards of the Bank were asked in February 2010 to approve the DRC's eligibility for the Fragile States Facility (FSF) Window I.

SUMMARY OF RATINGS

N°	Indicators	PCR	PPER	PPER Remarks
1	Relevance and Quality at Entry	3	3	PANPURC draws its relevance from its alignment with the DRC's development programme and strategy guidelines for the period concerned. It also consistent with the main thrusts of the Bank's CSP. Its approach is in line with that adopted recently in CSP 2008-12 and the Bank's Strategy for Fragile States. The project's quality at entry is considered satisfactory, due to the proper targeting of actions and beneficiary structures, among others. On the whole, the relevance and quality at entry are satisfactory.
2	Achievement of Objectives and Outcomes (Efficacy)	3	3	The project achieved the direct and intermediate outcomes expected, including: (i) improved reliability of monetary and banking statistics; (ii) improved debt management, and (iii) preparation of the PRSP through a participatory approach. It contributed to improving the country's development management capacity, although further progress is needed.
3	Efficiency	3	2	The delays in the completion of PANPURC diminished the projects efficiency, which is considered unsatisfactory because of the slippage in the implementation period.
4	Institutional Development Impact	2.6	3	PANPURC had a satisfactory impact on the country's institutional development, particularly by strengthening BCC in the area of financial intermediation, OGEDEP in debt management, SENAREC in capacity building, and other central economic agencies involved in programme formulation, which underwent changes in procedure, practices and the ability to deliver expected outputs
5	Sustainability	2.9	3	The sustainability of PANPURC's impact seems likely considering the development of the capacity of BCC, OGEDEP and SENAREC to design, plan and in turn undertake capacity-building actions, the commitment of these agencies to provide more quality services, that of the Government in capacity building and the development partners' constant support to DRC as a fragile State. However, this sustainability is weakened by the lack of financial resources (with the exception of BCC), gaps in training and the unreliability of the electricity and IT networks.
6	Aggregate Project Performance and Outcomes	2.8	3	The aggregate performance of PANPURC is deemed satisfactory despite its efficiency being considered unsatisfactory.
7	Borrower's Performance	3	3	The Government was heavily involved in the preparation and implementation of PANPURC. The various documents prepared under its responsibility, such as PNURC, I-PRSP or GPRSP provided a framework for PANPURC and other programmes financed by development partners. It made institutional arrangements for its implementation, mainly by strengthening SENAREC, and generally implemented it satisfactorily. The technical assistance provided with Bank support was generally put to good use, mainly because of the availability of national counterparts. However, compliance with the timetable was unsatisfactory. On the whole, the Borrower's performance is deemed satisfactory.
8	Bank Performance	3	3	At the preparation and appraisal stages, the Bank worked in close coordination with the Government and development partners, and took into account the urgent capacity building needs of the public administration. The introduction of IT tools was a decisive factor in modernising public service management and revitalising the country's economic administration. However, the Bank did not encourage adherence to deadlines. The Bank's performance is considered satisfactory.

I. THE PROJECT

1.1. Context and Rationale for Bank's Involvement

1.1.1. PANPURC, approved in June 2001 and completed in 2006, was implemented in the context of the late 1990s and early 2000s marked by the continuing civil war, but also the start of the peace process. In July 1999, a cease-fire agreement was signed by the Congolese Government, the main rebel groups and foreign countries involved. The political, economic and social situation was chaotic at the time as a result of the many years of misrule and civil and local wars that had led to millions of deaths and displaced persons as well as extensive damage. The situation was characterized socially by increased poverty and economically by a significant decline in production, hyper-inflation and the accumulation of substantial arrears in domestic and external public debt.

1.1.2. To move the country out of this situation, the DRC Government sought support from and initiated dialogue with multilateral and bilateral donors to develop and implement specific programs. In such a context, worsened by the weak capacity of national institutions, no sustainable reconstruction, stabilisation and economic recovery programme could be implemented effectively without capacity building. Hence the preparation by the Government of a medium-term National Emergency Programme for Capacity Building (PNURC), with support from the UNDP, in February 1999.

1.1.3. Initially, PNURC was to focus its action on the public and parastatal sectors at the central level. It was subsequently to be extended to all sections of Congolese society including the private sector, Civil Society and the Decentralised Administrative Entities (EADs). In November 1999, this programme was considered a reference framework by the Bank and other development partners, who undertook to participate in financing it². PANPURC forms part of the Bank's capacity building efforts in the DRC, which also include subsequent projects such as the Economic Recovery and Reunification Support Programme Institutional Support Project (PARER, 2003-2006) and the Multi-Sector Institutional Support Project (PAIM, 2002-2009), and other projects with a capacity building component. The Bank has also encouraged the authorities to design PRONAREC 2011-15, the future National Capacity Building Programme. PANPURC was implemented at the same time as other capacity building projects financed by other donors³. Its action at BCC and OGEDEP paved the way for other donors, such as IMF and WB.

1.1.4. Even though the current context is more favourable than in 2001, the DRC is still considered a fragile State⁴ still in need of considerable support from its development partners in the area of capacity building both at the central and local levels. Recent years have seen a gradual return of peace, albeit incomplete. The Constitution adopted by referendum in February 2006 and the 2006 elections marked the culmination of the national peace and reconciliation process, with notably the formation of a government of national unity. The DRC has emerged from its post-crisis situation, but remains a fragile State experiencing a gradual improvement in its situation, consistent with the Bank's continuous approach for fragile states⁵. The country faces immense challenges, where social needs are not met and institutional and administrative capacity is seriously diminished, particularly at

² This includes the following partners: Agencies of the UN System, World Bank, European Union, ADB, ACBF, IMF, BADEA, bilateral partners and international NGOs.

³ These projects dovetailed into the four categories of the PNURC's functions: (i) Steering the economy and sectors, (ii) Financial resource mobilisation, allocation and control, (iii) Supply of basic goods and services, and (iv) Administrative and judicial governance.

⁴ ADB, Operational Guidelines of the Fragile States Facility (FSF), July 2008.

⁵ The Bank's Fragile States Strategy defines four inter-related situations: Significant deterioration; active conflict and/or protracted crisis; post-crisis and/or transition and gradual improvement.

the local level, following the destruction caused by past civil wars and latent conflicts in the eastern provinces of the country.

1.1.5. The DRC adopted by referendum, in 2006, a Constitution that opted for decentralised organisation of institutions. The change from 11 provinces to 25 provinces, in addition to the City of Kinshasa, raised new challenges for capacity building at the local level. With provincial governments taking on the role of executing agencies, they needed, among others, to strengthen their management and planning capacity. Thus, implementation of PRONAREC is all the more necessary to create the best conditions for an effective transfer of responsibilities and resources from the central level to the provincial level, which thus requires a strong leadership and clearly defined priorities.

1.2. Project Formulation

1.2.1. The Bank identified the project during an inter-agency dialogue mission fielded in June 1999, during which the Government presented PNURC. Each of the partners present chose aspects of PNURC to finance and support. The Bank approved the National Capacity Building Programme Support Project (PANPURC) in June 2001. During the different stages of preparation and appraisal, the Bank and the Government held discussions on the project design and addressed together the institutional issues. The National Capacity Building Secretariat (SENAREC), the PANPURC Executing Agency, was thus closely involved in the design and implementation of PANPURC in two ways: as the government agency that prepared PNURC and as PANPURC Project Manager. SENAREC is an agency under the Ministry of Planning, which is funded from the national budget and contributions from development partners. The establishment of a Steering Committee was envisaged to serve as a guidance, monitoring and oversight body.

1.3. Project Objectives and Scope at Appraisal

1.3.1. The sector goal of PANPURC is to build national development management capacity. The project's specific objective is to support the emergence of the minimum institutional capacity for planning and macroeconomic management. PANPURC was one of the main instruments for implementation of PNURC, in regard to its functions relating to the formulation and coordination of policies and reforms and resource mobilisation, allocation and control. Together with UNDP and ACBF, the Bank was the main initial support of SENAREC.

3.15 The direct expected project outcomes were: i) improved reliability of monetary and banking statistics, (ii) improved debt management, (iii) preparation of the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRSP) using a participatory approach and (iv) a strengthened institutional framework for policy and reform coordination, and (v) improved national coordination and macroeconomic management capacity.

1.3.2. The main outputs consisted of the training programmes implemented and officials trained, structures strengthened and computerized, an operational debt database computerized and studies forming part of the GPRSP. The indicators for these outcomes and their linkages with the project objectives appear in the Retrospective Logical Framework Matrix. The PANPURC logical model, which presents the results chain, is in Annex 4.

1.3.3. To attain its outcomes, the project was structured around four components: (i) building the institutional framework for coordination of macroeconomic and sector policies and reforms; (ii) strengthening public debt management; (iii) supporting the participatory process in the preparation of the poverty reduction strategy; and (iv) Programme management and monitoring.

1.4. Financing Arrangements

1.4.1. PANPURC, initially amounting to a total of UA 2.73 million (UA 2.40 million, at completion) was jointly financed by the TAF, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Government. The TAF was to provide UA 1.97 million funding in the form of a grant, representing 72.2% of the total cost (UA 1.64 million, 68.5 %, at closing). CIDA contributed UA 0.30 million, in the form of a grant, while the Government counterpart contribution (equivalent value of the building and staff provided to the project) was UA 0.46 million, or in terms of percentage of the total cost at closing, 12.5% and 19.2%, respectively. A balance of UA 0.33 million (12% of the initial cost) was recorded at the end of the project.

1.4.2. The project inputs are presented in the following table shown through the actual expenditure by category. The relatively high equipment and operating expenses (higher than expected) are shown. The training expenses were relatively lower than expected.

PANPURC – Expenditure by Category of Expenditure						
	Consultants	Training	Equipment and Supplies	Operation	Audit	Total
% Total Actual Expenditure	22.3	15.2	37.6	23.2	1.7	100
Actual/Estimates (%)	101	87	98	132	-	88

II. EVALUATION

2.1 Evaluation Methodology and Approach

2.1.1 The methodology used is based on the guidelines of the Operations Evaluation Department (OPEV)⁶, which are modelled on the best practices of Multilateral Development Banks, particularly in terms of evaluation criteria. The evaluation matrix and Retrospective Logical Framework Matrix (relating to the project) were developed, first, to better determine the prioritization of objectives and expected outcomes and, secondly, to guide the collection, analysis and presentation of information on project implementation, performance and outcomes.

2.1.2 Project performance is assessed using the set of evaluation criteria selected by OPEV: relevance and quality at entry, efficacy, efficiency, institutional development impact, sustainability, Borrower's performance, Bank's performance and aggregate performance. The rating system used is that contained in the Bank Guidelines on PPER, already mentioned above. The evaluation has examined, to the extent possible, the Bank's specific contribution and the attribution of outcomes and impacts. The evaluation used the "before – after" approach to assess the project's achievements and impact. In the absence of quantitative data for some indicators, outcomes and impact could be measured only in terms of trends rather than degree. The evaluation matrix, which covers the key evaluation questions, is in Annex 6.

2.1.3 The evaluation used a variety of Policy documents (CSP, poverty reduction, macroeconomic and sector policies...) and project documents (appraisal, supervision and project completion reports). It also drew on discussions with key PANPURC stakeholders (local authorities, donors and main beneficiaries). These interviews focused on the stakeholders' perception of the expected and unexpected outcomes and impact of the project and the Bank's operations.

⁶ Revised Guidelines on Project Completion Report (PCR) Evaluation Note and Project Performance Evaluation Report (PPER), ADB/BD/IF/2001/94 and ADF/BD/IF/ 2001/85, OPEV, 26 September 2001,

2.1.4 To conduct interviews and collect data from the stakeholders, interview guides (especially, for OGEDEP, BCC and SENAREC), questionnaires on training (handed out to the beneficiary agencies and training participants), as well as questions and sub-questions drawn from the evaluation matrix, were used.

2.1.5 A PANPURC post-evaluation mission visited Kinshasa from 19 to 29 October 2009, to discuss and complete the preliminary analyses documented in the report. The field mission conducted interviews, collected documentation, conducted site visits and issued questionnaires to the trainees. This work helped to obtain documents that had not been identified or obtained at Headquarters, as well as answers to the questionnaires on training.

2.2 Availability and Use of Basic Data and Key Results Indicators

2.2.1 Although the documentation available was quite extensive, its main shortcoming was the limited number of quantitative indicators available on the level and trend of institutional capacity and on the impact of actions carried out. The key quantitative and qualitative indicators are assembled in the PANPURC retrospective matrix in Annex 5. Parts of the performance and monitoring indicators were identified from the project appraisal and completion reports while other new ones were identified during the analytical phase. The quantitative indicators include: CPIA indicators, Paris Declaration monitoring indicators, GDP growth rate, the HDI, timeframe for obtaining information, number of persons trained, number and quality of equipment delivered, etc. The qualitative impact indicators include: the Doing Business and Transparency International rankings, availability of the different GPRSPs, statistical publications, development programmes, studies, etc.

2.2.2 The Retrospective Logical Framework Matrix contains indicators on strategic elements identified by the logical model (purpose, goal, outputs, activities, inputs and outcomes) and highlights their causal relationships as well as assumptions about external factors that affected or may affect the success or failure of the project. The results-based Retrospective Logical Framework Matrix makes a clearer distinction between outputs and the expected development outcomes. It includes indicators for each level of outcomes and outputs. These indicators identified are used, despite the limitations of some of them, to measure and assess project performance. They are still insufficient, mainly for reasons of availability of information.

3. IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE

3.1 Adherence to Project Timetable and Costs

3.1.1 The project did not undergo any significant changes, except with regard to recruitment of consultants and the software procurement method, as indicated in the PCR.

3.1.2 The project was completed more than 30 months after the initial scheduled date (31/12/2003). The implementation thus spanned four years, representing a doubling of the planned execution timeframe. The grant disbursements were from 2002 to 2006. There are many reasons for this extended delay: SENAREC's initial poor knowledge of Bank procedures as it had not received any training at project inception; the invitation of bids and ensuing deliveries six (6) and 12 months behind schedule, respectively, due to SENAREC's said lack of familiarity with the procedures; the position of debt officer lying vacant for one year; delays in training; delays in the selection of the DMFAS and EVIEWS software; very slow processing of correspondence between the project and the Bank; delays in the replenishment of the revolving fund and also, initially, the effects of the

political and security situation. The disbursement rate of PANPURC was 88%, and varied depending on the components.

3.2 Project Management, Reporting and Monitoring-Evaluation

3.2.1 The terms and provisions of the grant agreement were generally fulfilled. However, the Steering Committee was set up late and rarely met, whereas it was required to do so quarterly. The Government counterpart contribution for the project was provided.

3.2.2 Key personnel (counterpart and contract) were assigned on time to SENAREC to implement the project. As a government agency responsible for capacity building, SENAREC also had to steer activities other than those of PANPURC and had to manage or oversee projects by other donors. In any event, it worked with a lean structure. Its personnel are generally well-qualified (nine professional and support staff, including the Coordinator, Deputy Coordinator and two programme officers)⁷. SENAREC implemented its work programme, took initiatives and dialogued with the Bank. It developed its initially weak management capacity and familiarised itself with the Bank's administrative rules and procedures for the procurement of goods and services. The technical assistance provided was generally utilised effectively, particularly for computerization, and by BCC and OGEDEP (debt management expert). The counterparts designated smoothly took over after the departure of the Technical Assistants, effecting a genuine transfer of skills.

3.2.3 There was proper beneficiary participation during project preparation and continued through the technical units set up as part of the components, especially for BCC and OGEDEP, and the study fund management committee. This participation was overall satisfactory and SENAREC coordinated the components satisfactorily. The Technical Unit for Mining Coordination and Planning however indicated that it would have wanted to participate more in the identification of the equipment it required in order to ensure that it was fully functional, considering that the server provided it has never been used.

3.2.4 Monitoring-evaluation was satisfactory. SENAREC produced quarterly reports (14) on schedule and with quality improving over time. However, these reports could have covered in more detail the activity of the technical units for components and that of the counterparts. The audits reflected the accuracy of the financial statements⁸. Over the four (4) years of field implementation (2002-2006), the project received six (6) supervision missions. The operation of the project can be considered satisfactory as its outputs and tools are still in use.

3.2.5 By using SENAREC, which played its expected role, the project was able to organise training, recruit experts and consultants and the deliver equipment. Overall, the implementation performance was considered satisfactory.

⁷ As indicated, this staff has been beefed up as part of the preparation of PRONAREC.

⁸ It should be noted, however, that two audit reports were provided instead of the three planned.

4 EVALUATION FINDINGS AND PERFORMANCE RATINGS

4.1 Key Findings

a.) Relevance and Evaluation of Quality at Entry

4.1.1 PANPURC derives its relevance mainly from its support to the National Emergency Capacity Building Programme adopted by the Government and its consistency with this programme's objectives. It is also in line with the implementation of the country's interim PRSP and subsequently GPRSP 2006-08. The sector objective of building national development management capacity and the specific objective of building national capacity in macroeconomic management were consistent with the main thrusts of two of the three PNURC components, namely: formulation and technical coordination of macroeconomic and sector policies and reforms, and resource mobilisation, allocation and control. They were also in keeping with the main thrusts of GPRSP Pillar 1, entitled "Promoting good governance and consolidating peace through institution building". The project is consistent with the pillars set out in the Bank's interim CSP 1999-2001 and CSP 2002-04 for the DRC, as contribution to institutional capacity building is an integral part of their objective. The project remains relevant because of its conformity with the Bank Group Strategy for Enhanced Engagement in Fragile States, which considers capacity building as a priority area. The project's quality at entry is considered satisfactory owing, among other aspects, to the targeting of actions and beneficiary organizations. It was aligned with the Bank's strategy of supporting the DRC's reconstruction and the revival of its activities in country along with other donors. It remains relevant because its approach is consistent with that adopted more recently by CSP 2008-12. PANPURC's areas of focus were highly appreciated by the authorities and beneficiaries.

4.1.2 The project's quality at entry is considered satisfactory, especially because of the targeting of actions to be undertaken, and the institutions to be strengthened (particularly, BCC, OGEDEP and SENAREC), despite the lack of relevant performance monitoring indicators. Governance and capacity building remain priorities of CSP 2008-2012. The decentralisation aspect, which is to be further supported during the second phase, was addressed through the studies planned in the regions for the GPRSP and the computerization efforts in the provincial departments of the BCC and their link with its national communication network.

4.1.3 Under the PNURC, a programme financed by several development partners who would be distributing tasks among themselves for its implementation, the project focused its efforts in relatively specific areas and activities, with clear expected outcomes. The objectives factored in the recipient's particular situation and development priorities, as well as clearly identified risks: The country's political instability and the existence of rebel troops; the low motivation and high turnover of public officials owing to poor wages; and the Administration's limited capacity. The project included measures to mitigate the impact of these risks: implementation of a post-conflict programme, salary review and capacity building for the Administration. However, the objectives were sometimes not clearly defined, which may make some objectives appear over-ambitious. Overall, the quality at entry is satisfactory.

4.1.4 Based on the foregoing, the relevance and quality of the project are satisfactory.

b.) Achievement of Objectives and Outcomes (Efficacy)

4.1.5 The project contributed as intended to improving the *reliability of financial and banking statistics* at the BCC, mainly through provision of computer hardware and software and the training

provided in financial intermediation, exchange control and processing of economic statistics. The computerization that it fostered played a key role in enabling BCC and other partners create the conditions for its consolidation.

4.1.6 The practical application of the training provided and the use of the hardware and software provided by the project resulted in a marked improvement in lead time for producing statistics and publications. Certain statistics that hitherto were produced in three months are now available within a week or two, while analytical reports and notes take a day or two instead of one week. Publications are more regular and of better quality: The 34th edition of the «*Condensé d'informations statistiques*» (“Summary Statistical Information”) was out in August 2009; while «*L'évolution économique récente*» (“Recent Economic Trends”) and the «*Note de conjoncture* » (“Economic Outlook”) publications, were available in August 2009, including data on the preceding months of 2009. However, dissemination of these statistics needs to be further expanded. Though still incomplete, these advances were useful to meet the monitoring needs of the IMF programmes (PRGF and SMP), which require financial statistics, particularly, on the foreign exchange system, the banking system and interest rates, which have to be regularly supplied⁹ to the IMF.

4.1.7 However, there is still need for improvement in all financial statistics, the Government Financial Operations Table, the balance of payments and economic accounts and in the accounting in terms of public expenditure commitments, which is currently cash-based. The comprehensive integration of databases at BCC would improve consistency of information and avoid this agency's numerous requests for information, especially from commercial banks. In collaboration with INS and with IMF support, the economic accounts are being revised with the adoption of SNA 1993 (replacing 1967), which would include the informal sector in the accounts and would result in a significant upward revision of GDP. The BCC Research Department introduced tools to conduct its activities, including the “monetary policy steering framework”; the “monetary policy calibration chart” under development; and the “monetary and financial flow chart”.

4.1.8 The computerization allowed significant progress in the automation of financial reporting. The electronic exchange of information with banks expanded. A computerized database on the macroeconomic and financial situation was set up at the Research Department, but the links between this database and that of the Department are yet to be defined. A statement of accounts register – with a central credit register envisaged – is being set up at the Credit Department. A database of transactions was created and allows exchange of information with the Ministry of Finance, which is a significant improvement on the previous situation. The BCC website provides useful information¹⁰ but it needs to function more regularly, likewise the BCC network in the regions. There is no remote payments clearing system, but a project is envisaged with the national payments system. There is still room for improvement of data automation.

4.1.9 The Bank's assistance through PANPURC helped *to improve debt management*, through the provision of technical assistance, computer hardware and training. Development partners (World Bank, IMF) consolidated these gains by subsequently providing further computerization and debt management assistance.

4.1.10 The project enabled OGEDEP to set up a computerized database on debt, which in itself is a breakthrough compared to the manual processing previously used. OGEDEP now uses networked IT equipment, and the DMFAS software, all of which were acquired by the project. The systems put in

⁹ DRC: Review of the 2006 Staff-Monitored Program and New Staff-Monitored Program for 2007, IMF Country Report 07/328, September 2007.

¹⁰ The BCC website provides information on the following areas: public finance; external sector; economic activities; money and credit, including inflation, exchange and interest rates.

place have been fairly well mastered, with their upgrade requiring specific technical assistance to install the latest version of DMFAS and debt simulation software. The database has captured 95% of external debt and is continually updated. It has records of about 220 agreements and 660 disbursement tranches by currency. Domestic debt arrears (certified debt and social debt, excluding bank loans) are also covered. This database has enabled OGEDEP to ensure more timely and rapid data delivery and improve publications on debt management. Thus, for the following-up of IMF programmes, OGEDEP is the source of some of the information sent by the Government to the IMF.

4.1.11 The improved information on the external debt is clearly reflected in the existing consensus on its level and the content of publications on debt. A committee for the reconciliation of debt figures, comprising OGEDEP, BCC and the Treasury, ensures consistency of the debt statistics. An agreement was reached in 2003 with development partners on evaluating the amount of the DRC's external debt. OGEDEP data on the external debt stock is increasingly used as a reference, for example those of the "Statistical Reports of the DRC Public Debt" (issues 1 and 2, October 2009). The statistical report presents the debt portfolio structure, the debt stock and the debt service from 2005 to 2008. It also includes the external debt service projections from 2009 to 2018¹¹.

4.1.12 Data on domestic debt is not yet well captured and that on the external debt is affected by the inadequate information provided OGEDEP by the agencies responsible for disbursement (development partners) or executing payment orders (banks, special accounts, etc.). Coordination is envisaged with the Aid and Investment Management Platform (PGAI), set up at the Ministry of Planning, which covers loans and grants in the DRC.

4.1.13 OGEDEP has not yet conducted detailed analysis of the debt, but its opinion is increasingly sought on public debt issues. Progress has been made at the national level in the formulation and implementation of the debt policy, and in which OGEDEP is more involved. Decision point was reached under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative in July 2003. Its completion point will only be reached upon satisfactory conduct of the first review of the PRGF 2010-2012¹² programme.

4.1.14 In sum, the improved indicators and publications on debt are due mainly to the training and equipment provided by the project to OGEDEP. Since 2001, an improvement has been observed in the qualification of OGEDEP personnel and the strengthening of its institutional capacity. The technical assistance was utilised satisfactorily due to a real transfer of skills. However, there are still some deficiencies in the debt data. The compatibility of the DMFAS database with those of the Ministry of Finance and BCC needs to be improved. Moreover, OGEDEP's equipment and software are becoming obsolete, and independent means of funding maintenance and replacement have not been adequately mobilised. The progress accomplished has generated within OGEDEP new needs for analyses, including that of debt sustainability, making it seek to equip itself with a new version of DMFAS (version 6) and simulation software such as DEBTPRO.

4.1.15 In terms of the *preparation of GPRSP 2006-08 based on a participatory process*, PANPURC's contribution consisted in providing thematic studies, training and mainly computer hardware. In this regard, the project financed and encouraged the conduct of seven studies¹³. These studies were expected to provide better socio-economic knowledge of the country and its regions in the wake of the civil war that destroyed the national statistical system. The studies, conducted over a period of

¹¹ In a statement in December 2009, already mentioned above, the IMF estimated the external debt stock at USD 13.1 billion and estimated that its servicing absorbs about a quarter of total spending. At the end of 2008, the external debt contracted or guaranteed by Government was estimated at 93% of GDP, 150% of exports and 502% of public revenue, excluding external aid.

¹² IMF Press Release n° 09/455 of 11 December 2009.

¹³ No department appears to be responsible for archiving these studies and funds for the project study should have been more substantial given the needs to be met.

nine months with 12 national consultants, were the following: (i) Study on affordability of healthcare for communities'; (ii) Study on improving school enrolment rates; (iii) Study on matching training to employment in the DRC; (iv) Study on strategies for the social protection of vulnerable groups; (v) Study on the national erosion control programme; (vi) Study on poverty reduction in grassroots communities; and (vii) Study on mechanisms for participatory monitoring of PRSP implementation.

4.1.16 Identified from the main themes highlighted at the National Sovereign Conference of 1991, these studies were useful in the preparation of the GPRSP, and are still useful for preparing sectoral policies and programmes:

- The study on matching training with employment needs and preparing the PRSP contains useful information on the effectiveness of known sectors and contributed to the evaluation of programmes. It allowed the DEP/ESU to assist in preparing the strategy for matching training to employment. This study continues to be updated and used, for example, with the statistics collected in 2007 and 2008, with the support of the ADB's Education Sector Support Project (PASE).
- The study on improving the school enrolment ratio was coordinated by the DIS/EPSP. The results of this study are used, in particular, by the Department of Planning and the Department of Education for their work.
- The study on healthcare affordability gave useful guidance, but it seems unclear that the strategy for strengthening the DRC's health system fully utilised its lessons, at least in terms of its formulation.
- The study on the national erosion control programme was conducted by the Ministry of Public Works and Infrastructure (DEP/TPI), but there seem to be problems with ministry's institutional memory.

4.1.17 Despite their significant contribution, the studies conducted for the GPRSP were insufficient and their quality should have been further improved. These studies were not widely distributed and properly archived.

4.1.18 The *strengthening the institutional framework for coordinating policies and reforms* was carried out through the measures taken with respect to BCC and SENAREC, as well as through the training and acquisition of equipment for the central coordinating departments of the economic ministries and the four Technical Secretariats of the Inter-ministerial Committees¹⁴ as well as the Technical Unit for Mining Coordination and Planning (CTCPM), which have generally shown better mastery of their IT tools. However, CTCPM could not set up the computer network planned and use the GDM mining software provided. It could not use the server provided by the project, due to technical difficulties, that the beneficiaries attribute to their limited participation in the preparation of the specifications.

4.1.19 SENARAC was closely involved in managing the project, serving both as the PANPURC managing body and the government agency responsible for preparing and steering its activities. To carry out its mission as PANPURC Executing Agency, SENAREC received equipment, training and support to cover part of its operating expenses. This support was crucial for SENAREC to have the

¹⁴ However, following the end of the post-conflict period, the coordinating secretariats were dissolved and integrated into the ministerial structures, where coordination is often very weak.

capacity to implement PANPURC, monitor the implementation of PNURC and prepare PRONAREC.

4.1.20 The project attained its intermediate results by helping to improve national coordination and macroeconomic management capacity in the post-conflict and transitional phases. Thus, the formulation and implementation of government macroeconomic policies were revived. PRGF 2002-05 and 2010-12 were concluded with the IMF in 2002 and 2009¹⁵, and IMF staff-monitored programs (SMPs) were developed for 2007 and 2009. I-PRSP 2002-05 and GPRSP 2006-08 (extended to 2010) were prepared. As part of the implementation of PRGF 2002 and the I-PRSP, the Emergency Multi-sector Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme (PMURR) and the Minimum Partnership Programme for Transition and Recovery (PMPTR) were prepared and subsequently adopted by donors, forming the framework for their operations for 2002 to 2007. The annual Priority Action Programmes (PAPs), which consolidate actions to be carried out and investments to be made, appear to have been poorly implemented. A DRC 2030 study is due to be launched soon and a development plan for 2010-15 is envisaged. While the capacity of SENAREC has been strengthened, that of the Ministry remains weak, even though it is recognized that it played a leading role in monitoring implementation of the GPRSP.

4.1.21 Although further progress is needed to improve the quality of programmes and strategies and the economic governance of the country, as revealed in the CPIA (World Bank and ADB) and other governance indicators available, the project's contribution to *improving development management capacity* is considered satisfactory, given the results obtained from BCC, OGEDEP and the GPRSP. However, efforts are still needed to achieve that ultimate goal. Indeed, the unsatisfactory quality of current programmes is reflected in various indicators. Thus, the World Bank indicator on the quality of budget and public financial management was only 2.0 in 2005 and 2006 and 2.5 in 2008. The Paris Declaration monitoring report shows that the indicator on the operational nature of the country's development strategy was rated D on a scale of A to E, in 2007, as in 2005. The indicator on the availability of a performance assessment framework was also unsatisfactory with a score of D on a scale of D to E, in 2007, as in 2005. Furthermore, in terms of the share of technical cooperation coordinated with national programmes, in 2006 and 2007, only 11% and 38% of capacity-building assistance were coordinated.

4.1.22 Overall, achievement of the project's objectives and outputs (efficacy) is considered satisfactory.

c. Efficiency

4.1.23 The positive outcomes observed were obtained in a management context characterized by the doubling of the implementation period (30 months slippage on the original completion date), irregular disbursements and a negative cost variation of 12% corresponding to the undisbursed balance of the ADF loan.

4.1.24 The highly unsatisfactory performance concerning compliance with the implementation schedule (completion time exceeding 9 months) was due, among other reasons, to the fact that at start-up and during the project, delays by the Congolese Government and by the Bank as well as the poor skills of the relevant SENAREC staff in project management resulted in late presentation of incomplete documents for disbursement, bidding and requests for no-objection. The extension of the project led to an overrun of 32% in its operating costs, at the expense of training and equipment.

¹⁵ The PRGF 2000 programme was discontinued in March 2006 due to budgetary slippages and delays in reforms. The PRGF 2010-12 programme was approved in December 2009.

Nonetheless, in the context of a country emerging from crisis, it was permissible for processes to take a little longer than usual.

4.1.25 The cost of equipment and supplies (38% of total actual expenditure) remained broadly consistent with the estimates of the appraisal report. The training and technical assistance costs appear normal and did not raise any specific comments from the beneficiaries. In the context defined above, it is worth noting that management of the project resources by the Congolese authorities was satisfactory.

4.1.26 Based on the foregoing, efficiency is considered unsatisfactory, overall.

d. Institutional Development

4.1.27 At the *BCC and in the financial system*, the project contributed to institutional capacity building, with the computerization of BCC resulting in profound changes in the work procedures and relations between BCC and the banks, as well as the gradually widening use of networking, including with the regions, or special connections (for example, with the Treasury). The working relations between BCC, the banks and other government departments as well as partners (IMF, WB and other donors) developed and improved. These improvements contributed to the progress in the formulation, implementation and supervision of the monetary policy and of the financial sector. They supported BCC, which was able to conduct a monetary policy that put an end to hyper-inflation. The August 2009 IMF mission observed that the country's monetary policy would continue to be strict, with the Central Bank rate remaining unchanged for further disinflation effort. The Government has planned new legislation for the financial sector. The objectives targeted are the consolidation and modernisation of the monetary policy steering mechanism in order to ensure price stability and improve banking services in the Congolese economy.

4.1.28 The financial sector reforms are continuing under the supervision of the Central Bank. Of the eleven (11) banks in operation, five (5) are undergoing thorough restructuring. Nine banks are also in the process of liquidation. Intermediation was restored in the banking system after the liquidation of state banks. This resumption of intermediation is evidenced by the balance sheet total of banks between 2000 and 2009, which was multiplied by 7. In addition, the amount of deposits in banks was multiplied by 10, with credits accounting for 70% of deposits. As part of the modernisation of BCC, financial intermediation supervision software was installed in 2007¹⁶. Some BCC Departments are currently equipped with modern management and monitoring facilities.¹⁷

4.1.29 At *OGEDep and in terms of debt management*, PANPURC's institutional development impact is apparent and satisfying, including improved working relations between OGEDep and the various departments involved in debt management. Its support, first, allowed the development of modern public debt management capacity. It facilitated maintaining OGEDep as an autonomous agency, since this was a grant condition, and the capacity building provided helped it significantly. This development had a positive impact on the entire debt management system (OGEDep, BCC, Treasury, etc.). A February 2008 decree confirms that OGEDep is the central public debt management body and defines its functions¹⁸. OGEDep, previously a state-owned corporation, was transformed into a public institution in April 2009, with a promise by the authorities to maintain employee benefits to prevent the departure of staff and ensure continuity in the delivery of quality

¹⁶ Banking Supervision Application (BSA) software

¹⁷ Status report on the implementation of the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (April 2007 to June 2008) – UPPE-GPRS, Draft 03, July 2008

¹⁸ Order 08/04 of 26 February 2008, which is not fully implemented, states that OGEDep is the centre for managing information on domestic and foreign debt, managing the databank on public debt, participates in identifying sources of financing, participates in the negotiation and conclusion of loan agreements, initiates debt service payments, keeps the accounts and statistics on domestic and external debt. Ministries and public and private companies seeking Government guarantee must obtain the expertise and opinion of OGEDep on the concessionality of the foreign funds sought.

services. DMFAS helped to change the work pyramid by strengthening it with trained personnel, especially technical staff (from three to eight). A procedures manual was prepared, but has since not been updated. Procedures linked to the automation introduced were established for debt management and the statistics production. Standards were gradually developed. In this regard, AFRITAC advised better compliance with international standards on debt and the World Bank made suggestions for improving procedures. OGEDEP is in greater demand and has to produce a half-yearly statistical bulletin, as well as quarterly debt service forecasts. It is more involved in debt negotiations, but its front office role remains mostly informal. The setting up of a National Public Debt Management Committee could strengthen OGEDEP's position.

4.1.30 PANPURC did not only contribute to the *institutional capacity-building of SENAREC* but also had an impact on the institutional development of all national capacity building activity. The institutional position of SENAREC, which is under the Ministry of Planning, was characterized by its activities and work for PANPURC, as well as its role of service to PNURC. A February 1998 order of the Ministry of Planning indicated that its mission was to prepare PNURC; mobilise financing from donors for the programme; implement the programme in the various ministries and agencies and monitor, assess and coordinate all actions related to the capacity building process countrywide. This institutional position was reaffirmed by the Kinshasa Agenda on Aid Effectiveness of 16 June 2009, in which the Government confirmed the role of SENAREC.

4.1.31 By drawing on the development of its resources and expertise through the implementation of PANPURC, SENAREC was able to monitor the implementation of PNURC¹⁹, gradually developed its capacity to mobilise resources for capacity-building and increased its projects portfolio to this end. Indeed, as part of the implementation of PNURC, SENAREC directly oversees the following projects: PREGESCO (Central African Civil Society Capacity Building Project, ACBF); GPE (Economic Policy Management with ACBF and WB); CASPOF (Capacity building of Networks of Women's Organisations, ACBF); CAPNAT (Strengthening Mobilisation of National Poverty Reduction Capacity, French Cooperation Agency) and MACROFOR (Macroeconomic Policy Formulation Unit, ACBF). It is present in their steering units and serves as the focal point with relevant donors. SENAREC was on the steering committees of ADB projects such as PAIM and PARER, whose management was monitored by BCECO²⁰. SENAREC is the focal point for monitoring the Paris Declaration while the Ministry of Planning is the Project Owner.

4.1.32 However, the Ministry of Planning and SENAREC have failed to give momentum to all the main thrusts of PNURC and incorporate most donor actions into it. An assessment for the period 2001 to 2004 showed that, out of USD 511 million in commitments by development partners towards capacity building in the DRC, USD 208 million was released. Out of that amount, USD 35 million, or only 17% was actually used for the implementation of PNURC activities and USD 173 million, or 83% of the amount released was allocated to interventions other than PNURC. The Paris Declaration Survey on Monitoring showed that in 2006 and 2007, only 11% and 18%, respectively, of capacity building assistance was channelled through coordinated programmes. These estimates showed that the action of development partners and Government was patchy, reflecting a problem with coordination, and perhaps also with defining the areas of capacity building. This lack of coordination is not limited to capacity building, but also affects all ODA, because in the DRC there is no single and integrated framework for ODA programming and budgeting, meaning "that in the absence of a unifying programme, each donor draws up its own program and carries out its monitoring and evaluation"²¹.

¹⁹ Assessment and Prospects of Capacity Building in the DRC, SENAREC, 2005.

²⁰ In the view of the main beneficiaries, these two projects did not have the expected impact due to the lack of coordination with PANPURC and with each other.

²¹ 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration©, OCDE 2008.

4.1.33 Thus, according to the evaluation report produced by SENAREC, the various operations had a limited impact because of the lack of a shared vision and the poor identification of needs in some cases. This dispersal of efforts led to the creation of several executing agencies without skills or resources. Moreover, PNURC, in its first phase, did not make sufficient provision for decentralisation, a fundamental option of the 2006 Constitution. The second phase of PNURC needed to do so more.

4.1.34 To address these weaknesses, resources and institutional arrangements were recommended by the June 2009 Kinshasa Agenda on Aid Effectiveness²² and by PRONAREC 2011-15. The Government and development partners committed to improving the institutional framework for aid management, building the institutional capacity of the public sector and making greater use of national procedures, structures and expertise.

4.1.35 Based on the foregoing, the overall institutional development impact, particularly on BCC, OGEDEP and SENAREC, is considered satisfactory.

e) Sustainability

4.1.36 The positive and negative elements considered in the analysis of likely sustainability are based on assessment of the following factors: technical soundness, long-term Borrower commitment, socio-political support, resilience to exogenous factors and institutional arrangements.

4.1.37 *Technical soundness:* Debt and financial information is of better quality and more readily available thanks to the methods allowed by computerization. However, the sustainability of this progress may be hampered by the rapid obsolescence of equipment, deficiencies in the electricity and computer networks, the fragility of the databases and the lack of long-term prospects for training. Continuity of the progress made is based on the assumption that the equipment and software will be maintained and that there are medium and long-term prospects for staff training. These conditions can only be met with support from development partners, and only partly to BCC.

4.1.38 Recurrent expenditure (operating, maintenance and replacement costs) is not sufficiently covered by national funding. At OGEDEP, the maintenance contract with UNCTAD for DMFAS has expired, whereas maintenance of the debt database is linked to that of the hardware and DMFAS.

4.1.39 More generally, the poor quality of the electricity and IT networks interferes with sustainable use of the internet and ICT capabilities. These issues have not yet been examined in light of a country IT strategy, as recommended by the Bank's Operational Strategy for ICT. In addition, training programmes were limited in time and lacked long-term prospects. The training material provided is no longer available, the personnel trained are not followed up and the training of new employees has not been addressed. The training policies are not backed by appropriate policies for managing the personnel trained, especially by the Civil Service, where low wages and poor organisation favour high turnover and act as disincentives to staff, thus undermining the sustainability of the solutions adopted.

4.1.40 *Long-term Borrower commitment and socio-political support:* The Government's past and present capacity building commitments constitute a positive factor for sustainability. This was confirmed through PRONAREC 2011-15 and the 2009 Kinshasa Agenda on Aid Effectiveness. These commitments were boosted by those of donors including the ADB, which directed substantial economic assistance flows to all sectors, with annual disbursements of USD 800 million in 2004 and

²² Kinshasa Agenda on Aid Effectiveness, Proceedings of the Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Kinshasa, 15-16 June 2007.

2005²³. In 2009, in response to the crisis, development partners, including ADB, World Bank, IMF and European Union, allocated emergency assistance to the tune of USD 440 million, of which USD 97 million from the Bank. These aid flows will continue and contribute to sustainability, even if their level is insufficient because of the enormous challenges of the country. Preparation of PRONAREC 2011-15 is also an opportunity to widen the socio-political support of capacity building, which has been weakened by the poverty of the majority of the population, the decentralisation difficulties, very low salaries and high turnover of civil servants and poor governance.

4.1.41 *Resilience to exogenous factors.* The substantial wealth of the country, the GPRSP, the PRGF and the progress made in debt management and the BCC's policies provide the policy framework to better withstand negative exogenous factors²⁴. The support of development partners remains crucial because the project does not generate direct revenue for operating and maintenance costs and budgetary allocations are insufficient.

4.1.42 *Institutional arrangements.* There are positive developments for the sustainability of institutional arrangements, particularly with the adoption of the 2006 Constitution, which is a sustainable framework for organising institutional capacity building. However, this sustainability is limited by weaknesses such as lack of coordination of national and international agencies, failure to make adequate provision for local capacity building and poor governance. To remedy these weaknesses, PRONAREC has provided for resources and policies. The important role of the Ministry of Planning and SENAREC is also confirmed, thus allowing the use of these national bodies, which have the minimum skills and resources required, for the implementation of PRONAREC. Furthermore, SENAREC could be more effective in future after the likely strengthening of its staff numbers as part of the preparation of PRONAREC, and following the recommendations of its ongoing organisational audit, conducted by UNDP in close collaboration with the WB and ADB.

4.1.43 More broadly, the financial and institutional resources mobilised by the planned PRONAREC will produce lasting results only if they are based on a clear Government vision underpinned by the reorganisation of public administration at all levels and actual consideration of decentralisation as the fundamental option adopted by the Constitution. This vision must embody the logic of developing an efficient and results-oriented administration that fosters greater accountability by public and regional officials, ensures accountability for actions taken and develops a culture of monitoring and evaluation of results. The Government's vision should make it possible to remedy the considerably weak local capacity. In view of the challenges of modernisation, decentralisation, and the structuring of public administration, the capacity building strategy must be redesigned at all levels, drawing on lessons learnt from previous experiences. These are ambitious medium and long-term goals, which are not easy to achieve in the country's current governance context.

4.1.44 All in all, including in the context of the DRC, sustainability of the positive outcomes achieved by the project is likely, despite the gaps identified, which the country can surmount, particularly with the support of the international community through the implementation of the principles of good international engagement in fragile states and situations.

²³ Excluding the cost of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and support for the recent elections. Source: World Bank Country File on the website.

²⁴ IMF Press Release No. 09/455 of 11 December 2009.

4.2 Performance Ratings

a) Overall Project Performance and Outcomes

4.2.1 PANPURC performed satisfactorily in terms of the following criteria: relevance and quality at entry, efficacy, efficiency and institutional development. There is also a satisfactory degree of likelihood that the project outcomes are maintained in the medium and long terms, while remaining resilient to exogenous factors, mainly because of the ownership of actions by the beneficiary entities that have taken due advantage the technical assistance through national counterparts, government commitment in the area of capacity building and the constant support of partners to the DRC as a fragile State., The aggregate performance of PANPURC is considered on the whole satisfactory.

b) Borrower's Performance

4.2.2 The Government actively prepared PNURC with the support of UNDP and then presented it to partners including the Bank, which in view of its contents and the Government's commitment, decided to support it. SENAREC was closely involved in the design and implementation of PANPURC. The BCC and OGEDEP were involved in the preparation of PANPURC in their fields of activity, and technical implementation units were planned for them, to support PANPURC. Institutional arrangements were made for counterpart funding and the setting up of a steering committee. Adjustments were made during implementation to the duration of the contracts of the experts and to extend the operating budget in response to project delays.

4.2.3 The quality of implementation was satisfactory despite some difficult security and political situations during certain periods. The key personnel were assigned as planned. SENAREC worked with a lean structure and with well-qualified personnel. It implemented its work programme, took initiatives and dialogued with the Bank. It developed over time its initially weak management capacity and familiarised itself with the Bank's rules and complied with the relevant administrative procedures for the procurement of goods and services. However, the Steering Committee rarely met and coordination with PAIM and PARER was very limited. PAIM could have been planned as a second phase of PANPURC for more targeted focusing of its actions. Adherence to project costs was quite satisfactory because the overall project cost was not exceeded and contracts remained within the financial allocation fixed. The terms and conditions of the loan agreement were generally complied with. The adequacy of monitoring and evaluation and report preparation was very satisfactory.

4.2.4 Technical assistance, a key component of capacity building, was generally utilised effectively, including for the computerization of OGEDEP (debt management expert) due to the appropriate use of national counterparts and the favourable motivating conditions. Overall, the Borrower's performance was considered satisfactory.

c) Bank's Performance

4.2.5 At the preliminary identification stage, the Bank worked in close coordination with the Government and other donors, including UNDP, the World Bank and IMF. Preparation and appraisal were conducted in liaison with the Government and in coordination with development partners, while taking into account the country's fragile situation at the political, economic and financial levels.

4.2.6 Based on analyses, the Bank lowered the initial financing estimates for the preparation phase in line with the Bank resource available. The reduction of the grant thus limited the number of studies and surveys and did not make it possible to procure all the equipment planned for the ministries. The grant was definitely the appropriate tool in this low-income post-conflict country. The risks and mitigating actions were identified. However, the project logical framework matrix could have been more detailed and included more objectively verifiable indicators.

4.2.7 The Bank did not field launching missions and failed to provide timely training for the managers. It was also sometimes late in responding to requests and correspondence. Six supervision missions were organised in four years. Delays were also sometimes recorded in the release of revolving funds. Coordination with other partners contributed to the successful implementation of the project.

4.2.8 Unfortunately, the Bank did not turn the positive PANPURC results to account in the implementation of subsequent projects. Adherence to the timetable was unsatisfactory considering the doubling of the project implementation time due to the start-up delays caused by the insufficient training of managers, the Bank's late response times and the security and political situation in the country.

4.2.9 On the whole, the Bank's performance is considered satisfactory.

4.3 Factors affecting Implementation Performance and Outcome

4.3.1 Several factors influenced project implementation, performance and outcomes. They are classified into several categories. Among those beyond the control of the Government or the executing agencies are world market prices, natural disasters, civil war and performance of the Bank and other partners. The civil war constantly had a negative effect on all aspects of economic and social life, throughout the period and in spite of the peace agreements, with serious disturbances erupting again in September 2008. There were significant, favourable and mostly unfavourable fluctuations in world market prices that disrupted external financing and public finances. This weakened the national capacity to finance capacity building and worsened the issue of the salary levels and motivation of public workers in the face of inflation. Global environmental issues also had a negative impact that was beyond the country's control.

4.3.2 In contrast, the contribution of the Bank and development partners was positive throughout the period, but the dependence on international aid is too high. The last Paris Declaration monitoring report for the DRC considered that ownership of aid was average in 2007 while its alignment and harmonisation were poor²⁵.

4.3.3 Other factors fall within the purview of the Government, such as macroeconomic policies, government commitment, governance, appointment of key personnel, the provision of counterpart funds and administrative procedures. During the period, these factors had negative or positive impacts, depending on the factors or periods, with governance remaining poor. Thus, progress towards the HIPC completion point was hampered between 2005 and 2006, with the slowing of reforms and then by the global economic crisis.

4.3.4 Factors generally within the control of executing agencies played a positive role, such as project financial management, staffing, limited changes in costs, use of technical assistance, preparation of project reports and the participation of beneficiaries to ensure continuity of project benefits.

²⁵ 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration©, OCDE 2008.

5 CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusions

5.1.1 Despite a difficult national post-conflict context, marked by the weak capacity of national institutions and the fact that capacity building efforts in Africa have not always had the desired effectiveness, the project is considered a success story. This success stems from sound project design and implementation but also from real ownership by the beneficiary entities, despite the delay in implementation time.

5.1.2 PANPURC responded satisfactorily to the Government's main concern, which was to contribute to capacity building, as part of PNURC, in order to develop minimum capacity for the resumption of fruitful cooperation with development partners, prepare and implement reconstruction programmes and revive the economy. Today, these goals have been achieved. Indeed, peace agreements have been signed and the DRC has emerged from the post-conflict period, since the GPRSP and other development programmes have been prepared and full cooperation has been restored with development partners. This cooperation has been reflected in the DRC reaching the HIPC decision point, the regular holding of consultative group meetings and the allocation of substantial loans and grants. PANPURC has contributed fully to this development by supporting the equipping and modernisation of public administration through its computerization and the training of relevant officers, supporting OGEDEP in debt management, BCC in the computerization and equipping of its regional communication network and in the preparation of the GPRSP.

5.1.3 The project has played a pioneering role in modernising the macroeconomic management structures of the DRC. The results obtained are satisfactory in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and institutional development, particularly with regard to debt management, the computerization of financial information and preparation of the GPRSP, as well as in building national capacity in coordination and macroeconomic management, which is still however at an insufficient level. The impact on development management is satisfactory although more effort is needed in this regard. The good results obtained are due mainly to the clarity of its objectives resulting from proper analysis of the baseline situation, proper targeting of the institutions and systems to be strengthened, the consultation of beneficiaries, the coordination role played by SENAREC and the choice of instruments (grant, training, technical assistance and studies).

5.1.4 The Government's political commitment to restoring peace and improving governance, and the firm commitment of development partners to support the DRC were instrumental in obtaining this initial progress. Thus, the DRC has moved from a post-conflict phase to that of gradual improvement, based on the approach adopted by the Bank for fragile states. The sustainability of the project's positive outcomes within the context of a fragile State is possible despite the inadequacies observed, which are surmountable. The gradual consideration of decentralisation, which is enshrined in the Constitution, is likely to give more impetus to capacity building at the local level.

5.1.5 Development assistance coordination, harmonisation and alignment are still insufficient in the DRC, with the result that the development partners' assistance is fragmented and its capacity building impact limited. This situation reflects a lack of comprehensive vision of the capacity building envisaged. In short, significant challenges remain relating to the magnitude of unmet needs, the turnover of human resources, and the immensity and complexity of the decentralisation task. In this context, finalisation based on a vision and the proper implementation of the National Capacity Building Programme (PRONAREC), are crucial for the continuity of capacity building in the DRC.

5.2 Key Lessons Learnt

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- vi. The success of capacity-building projects depends on clear objectives that are based on a sound analysis of the baseline situation and the country's needs and targeting the right institutions and systems to be strengthened.
- vii. The involvement of the beneficiary structures from project inception, particularly in the identification of needs, encourages ownership, coverage of recurrent expenditure and continuity of capacity building activities beyond the project.
- viii. An effective programme for building capacity in the public administration must form part of a long-term vision based on the reorganisation of an effective and results-oriented administration that takes into account the needs of decentralisation and is underpinned by measures to increase public officials' awareness of their responsibilities, institution of accountability and a culture of monitoring/ evaluation of results and performance.
- ix. In fragile states, public administration capacity building cannot be limited solely to training and the transfer of skills and equipment. It will require putting in place incentive structures and the motivation needed to bring about behaviour change among key actors to support the rehabilitation potential of the administrative structure.
- x. The establishment of a national capacity building coordination agency, through budget support and an integrated ODA programming platform is a major asset for undertaking the restructuring of the public services of a fragile State.

5.3 Key Recommendations

For the Government

- xi. Develop a long-term vision for building capacity in the public administration, which should be run using a results-based approach, fully taking into consideration the decentralisation enshrined in the Constitution, which PRONAREC will be part of.
- xii. Capacity building involves training and the provision of equipment over the long-term as well as changes in institutional rules and organisational systems, including appropriate and motivating human resource management and remuneration policies.
- xiii. Drive the modernisation of the public administration, by focusing on computerization and setting up data transmission networks as part of a national strategy for ICT development, which can be prepared and implemented with Bank support.
- xiv. Move forward with decentralisation and strengthen local capacity while taking due account of the considerable weakness in local resources, especially in areas such as statistics, studies, planning, computerization and communication networks. In this regard, it is important to develop more national training programmes in the area of capacity building in coordination and macroeconomic management to support local administrations.

- xv. Promote the coordination, ownership, alignment and harmonisation of development partners' capacity building interventions, and establish an integrated ODA programming platform, with appropriate leadership.
- xvi. Ensure the institutional viability of SENAREC as a national capacity building coordination structure in order to implement the ambitious national public administration modernisation programme, PRONAREC, which is being finalised.

For the Bank

- xvii. Support the Government's decentralisation efforts, particularly in building local capacity in statistics, studies and planning as well as in access to IT networks.
- xviii. In keeping with the FSF²⁶ objectives regarding knowledge building and management, use the resources of the Targeted Support Window to conduct Economic and Sector Work (ESW) on the various dimensions of the DRC's fragility, reconstruction and development.
- xix. Support modernisation of the public administration by providing assistance for computerization support for preparation and implementation by the Government of an ICT development strategy.
- xx. Support the Government in providing, at the national and local levels, training in management and planning to assist local institutions whose role has been strengthened as part of decentralisation.

5.4 Feedback on Evaluation Findings

5.4.1 Points requiring follow-up actions are included in the Matrix of Recommendations, presented in Annex 3.

²⁶ The Boards of the Bank were asked in February 2010 to approve the DRC's eligibility for the Fragile States Facility (FSF) Window I.

RATING SHEETS OF PPER/PANPURC/DRC**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
NATIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMME SUPPORT PROJECT
(PANPURC)**

EVALUATION CRITERIA			
No.	Component Indicators	Score (1 to 4)	REMARKS
1	<u>Relevance and Quality at Entry Assessment</u>	<u>3</u>	Satisfactory
i)	Consistency with Country Overall Development Strategy	4	PANPURC is in line with the objectives of the National Capacity Building Programme (PNURC) adopted by the Government. It forms part of the implementation of the I-PRSP 2002-05 and subsequently GPRSP 2006-08, for which promoting administrative, political and economic governance and improving the statistical system form part of the main thrusts of the first strategic pillar.
ii)	Consistency with Bank Assistance Strategy	4	It is consistent with the main thrusts of the Bank's interim CSP 1999-2001 and CSP 2002-04 for the DRC, which identified as a structural constraint to development, the disorganised and unmotivated Congolese public administration, which lacks the minimum equipment and human resources to accomplish its public service mission. It fitted into the Bank strategy for the resumption of its activities in the DRC, along with other donors. Its approach is aligned with the approach adopted in CSP 2008-12 and the Bank guidelines for the capacity building of fragile States (2008).
iii)	Macroeconomic Policy	3	PANPURC was prepared in liaison with other donors, including the IMF, which at the time was preparing for the country's PRGF 2002-05, and which approved in December 2009 PRGF 2010-12. In that context aggravated by the weak capacity of the national institutions, there could be no effective reconstruction programme without capacity building.
iv)	Sector Policy	3	PANPURC covered the sector objectives of capacity building in the areas of debt management, banking and poverty reduction. Studies conducted in several sectors were expected to be useful for sector programming and policy works.
v)	Public Policy Reform	3	PANPURC was expected to support reform efforts in the finance (debt management, BCC) and planning sectors.
vi)	Poverty Reduction	3	The studies planned by the project were meant to contribute to the preparation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper adopted in 2006.
vii)	Social and Gender Equality	3	The studies conducted were to cover the social aspects (education, health) and gender. The project was to allow systematic information exchange between the social ministries (health, education) and the government agencies for coordinating, managing and monitoring budget implementation and external assistance, as well as improving relations between the social ministries and donors.
viii)	Environmental Concerns	3	Environmental concerns were to be presented in the studies conducted and in the GPRSP. A study was conducted on the National Erosion Control Programme.
ix)	Human Resource Development	3	The major training programme envisaged by the project was a key element for capacity building.

EVALUATION CRITERIA			
No.	Component Indicators	Score (1 to 4)	REMARKS
x)	Institutional Development	3	As an institutional support project, PANPURC attached great importance to the institutional strengthening of several agencies: BCC, OGEDEP, Ministries responsible for finance and planning, and agencies responsible for coordination. The decentralisation aspect, which was to be covered during a second phase of PNURC, was given little attention.
xi)	Private Sector Development	N/A	-
xii)	Regional Economic Integration	N/A	The improved financial and debt statistics allowed the country to better examine the consistency of its policies with CEMAC convergence criteria. Regional integration was however not directly mentioned at appraisal.
xiii)	Quality at Entry	3	The project properly targeted actions to be undertaken and the beneficiary institutions. By dovetailing into PNURC, which was financed by several development partners, the project focused its efforts in relatively specific areas. Its objectives reflected the development priorities of the Borrower, but were at times not clearly defined, thus making some objectives appear over-ambitious. Also noteworthy is the lack of relevant performance monitoring indicators. The logical framework was not sufficiently detailed. Risks were properly determined.
xiv)	Other (Specify)	-	-
2	<u>Achievement of Objectives and Outcomes (“Efficacy”)</u>	<u>3</u>	Satisfactory
i)	<u>Policy Goals</u>	<u>2</u>	
	Economic Development	3	The targets of building capacity in the formulation of cooperation programmes with partners, initial growth recovery and for contributing to poverty reduction were largely achieved. PRGF programmes were concluded with the IMF in 2002 and 2009, leading to the restoral of financial cooperation, which was subsequently pursued by the Bank and other donors. The post-conflict development programme planned was formulated, then approved and financed by partners. Other programmes were successively implemented, including the Government Economic Programme (2002-2005), with the support of PRGF2002; Emergency Multi-sector Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme (PMURR, 2002), and GPRSP 2006-08, which was prepared and approved.
	Macroeconomic Stabilisation	3	DRC experienced a relatively stable economic environment between 2001 and 2004, albeit with a slackening of macroeconomic policies in 2005 and 2006, which undermined progress. A tightening of fiscal policy in 2007 helped stabilise the macroeconomic situation. The project had a limited impact on the MPDE’s capacity relating to the macroeconomic framework, planning and budget formulation; nonetheless, it can be assumed that it contributed to macroeconomic stability.
	Public Investments and Expenditures	2	The I-PRSP and GPRSP envisaged an action and investment programme aimed at growth and poverty reduction. The PAP adopted was not complied with.

EVALUATION CRITERIA			
No.	Component Indicators	Score (1 to 4)	REMARKS
	Monetary Reforms	3	PANPURC indirectly supported monetary reform through its support to the capacity building of BCC and its impact on its work procedures as a result of its computerization. The improved financial statistics and automation of financial information facilitated monetary policies and reforms.
	Debt Management	3	Consistent with the objectives, debt management capacity was strengthened and a computerized database was set up. The more reliable statistics made it possible to reach an agreement with partners on the level of debt. The DRC reached decision point of the HIPC Initiative. Publications are more regular.
	Banking Sector Reforms	3	PANPURC indirectly supported banking reform through its support to BCC and its impact on its work procedures, as a result of its computerization.
	Civil Service Reform	N/A	-
	Labour Legislation	N/A	-
	Procurement Policies	N/A	-
	Other (Specify.....)	N/A	.-
ii)	<u>Physical Objectives</u>	<u>3</u>	<p>Training materials used and improved quality of services resulting in a change from work previously done manually to electronically.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IT hardware (101 computers, 61 printers, 64 UPS, 11 photocopy machines) • Vehicles (11) • Furniture and office equipment • Four software packages (Eviews 5.0 for BCC, GDM for CTCPM, DMFAS for OGEDEP and GIN for SENAREC) • Mobile telephone and telephone exchange • Wiring and network
iii)	<u>Financial Targets</u>	<u>2</u>	Unsatisfactory
	Financial Viability	N/A	-
	Cost Recovery	N/A	-
	Restructuring	N/A	-
	Other (Specify): Financial resource mobilisation for PNURC	2	The objective of mobilising external resources for PNURC was not achieved as part of the resources raised were assigned by partners to other capacity building activities outside PNURC. Of the USD 511 million pledged by development partners for capacity building in DRC, USD 208 million, i.e. about 41%, was released. Only 17% of the amount released was actually allocated to the implementation of PNURC activities.
iv)	<u>Institutional Development Objectives</u>	<u>3</u>	The institutional development objectives were achieved satisfactorily.
	- National Capacity	3	National capacity was strengthened, particularly with regard to BCC, OGEDEP, SENAREC and other government agencies.

EVALUATION CRITERIA			
No.	Component Indicators	Score (1 to 4)	REMARKS
	- Economic Management	3	The project outcomes had a positive impact on strengthening the capacity of beneficiary structures, particularly the technical secretariats; the technical departments of the Ministry, BCC and OGEDEP. Management of public debt and the banking sector was improved.
	- Civil Service Reform	N/A	-
	- Governance	2	BCC and OGEDEP are contributing more to good governance. The institutional position of the Ministry of Planning and SENAREC in capacity building was strengthened by the Ministry of Planning orders of 2009 and the 2009 Kinshasa Agenda on Aid Effectiveness.
	- Poverty Alleviation	3	I-PRSP 2002-05 and GPRSP 2006-08 were adopted in June 2002 and July 2006, respectively, with the active contribution of PANPURC in a participatory process. The project conducted seven studies for the GPRSP, over a period of 9 months, using 12 national consultants.
	- Financial Intermediation	3	BCC was strengthened through the training of its officers and the Computer hardware. The computerization of financial information has allowed shorter information delivery times and its greater reliability. The electronic exchange of information with banks has expanded. The BCC website carries useful information and statistics, but it is not regularly updated
	- Support to the Private Sector	N/A	-
	- Environment	N/A	Study conducted on the National Erosion Control Programme
	- Sectoral Capacity, Debt Management	3	As expected, the Bank's assistance improved debt management with the provision of technical assistance, computer hardware and training that enabled the installation and use of DMFAS, an electronic database on debt. Development partners (World Bank, IMF) subsequently contributed to consolidating these computerization and debt management efforts.
	- Other (Specify):		The number of persons trained by PANPURC in its field of activity is relatively high. Over 100 officers received computer training while 615 others were trained in various modules on the job and at seminars or workshops locally or abroad. Training plans were drawn up and implemented (ministerial departments, BCC, OGEDEP, SENAREC, etc.). The list of workshops and training sessions organised, with information on the number of persons trained, is available.
	- Executing Agency	3	Capacity building of SENAREC
	- Planning/Policy Analysis	3	SENAREC regularly prepared reports on the capacity building policy and its implementation, under PANPURC
	- Financial Management	3	The initial lack of experience of SENAREC staff was remedied. The staff subsequently gained experience and received training, and financial management became compliant with Bank rules. There was no overrun of Bank financing, but an adjustment was made to the expenditure structure, under operating expenses, because of the extension of its duration.

EVALUATION CRITERIA			
No.	Component Indicators	Score (1 to 4)	REMARKS
	- Skill Upgrading	3	SENARAC personnel received the training planned. SENARAC organised training for the project's beneficiary institutions. The training was satisfactory, despite its sustainability gaps.
	- Personnel Management	3	The appropriate personnel were assigned and received training. SENARAC opted for and effectively utilised a lean structure with a staff of nine officers and support personnel, including the Coordinator, Deputy Coordinator and two programme officers. Its staff strength was recently boosted in connection with the preparation of PRONAREC.
	- Management Information System	3	An accounting system was implemented. Accounting, which was initially manual, was computerized after the GN software was acquired. The audits did not reveal any irregularities. Quarterly reports were regularly submitted.
	- Agency Restructuring	3	The institutional positions of the Ministry of Planning and SENAREC in capacity building were strengthened by the Ministerial Orders of 2009 and the 2009 Kinshasa Agenda on Aid Effectiveness.
	- Other (Specify)		-
v)	<u>Social Objectives and Targets</u>	N/A	Through its work in support of the GPRSP, particularly the studies financed, the project contributed to efforts to achieve social objectives, but there has been no notable change in the living conditions of the population.
	Poverty Alleviation	N/A	The seven studies financed by project contributed to the preparation of GPRSP 2006-08. Achievement of the MDGs remains a remote goal.
	Protection of Vulnerable Groups	N/A	The study on strategies for the social protection of vulnerable groups has not yet been translated into action.
	Reduction in Income Disparities	N/A	The study on poverty reduction in grassroots communities is yet to be translated into an action plan
	Participatory Development	N/A	The study on mechanisms for participatory monitoring of PRSP implementation has not yet been followed up.
	Gender Equality	N/A	Women accounted for about 10% of the staff trained. The GPRSP studies had a gender dimension
	Access & Quality of Services	3	The quality of services in the sectors is still poor.
	Improved Health	2.	The study on communities' affordability of healthcare is not sufficiently exploited.
vi)	<u>Environmental Objectives</u>	2	The action taken on the study is not known by the department concerned
vii)	<u>Private Sector Development</u>	N/A	
3	Efficiency	2	Unsatisfactory
i)	<u>Economic Rate of Return</u>	N/A	Not calculated
ii)	<u>Financial Rate of Return</u>	N/A	Not calculated
iii)	<u>Cost-Effectiveness Indicators</u>	2	The positive outcomes observed were obtained in a context characterized by the doubling of the implementation period (30 months slippage on the original completion date), irregular disbursements and a negative cost variation of 12%, corresponding to the undisbursed balance of the ADF loan.
4	<u>Institutional Development Impact</u>	3	Satisfactory

EVALUATION CRITERIA			
No.	Component Indicators	Score (1 to 4)	REMARKS
i)	<u>National Capacity</u>	3	
	- Economic Management	3	The project contributed to improving capacity and practices for better economic management in the areas of debt, the financial system, capacity building and economic policy, thanks to the impact on the national economy from the contributions of BCC, OGEDEP, SENAREC, GPRSP and the economic programmes developed with the project's support.
	- Civil Service Reform	N/A	
	- Governance	2	Economic governance remains unsatisfactory as shown in available indicators, despite the progress made in the governance of debt and the financial system. This is particularly apparent in the lack of coordination of ministerial action and corruption. The Ministry of Planning and SENAREC could not incorporate the majority of donor capacity building actions into PNURC. Considerable progress is still needed to improve the quality of these programmes and the country's economic governance, as reflected in the unsatisfactory indicators of the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA, ADB) and other economic governance indicators. The Kinshasa Agenda and SENAREC, through PRONAREC, make proposals for capacity building for improved governance. The overall institutional context was better clarified with the adoption of the new 2006 Constitution and the establishment of elected institutions and the Government, but it still needs substantial improvement, particularly in governance and decentralisation.
	- Poverty Alleviation	2	The impact of the GPRSP and PNURC on the institutional capacity for poverty reduction is still insufficient.
	- Financial Intermediation	3	BCC was strengthened with the support of the Government, IMF and its partners, including the Bank. The Bank's effective support to its computerization resulted in better financial statistics and the automation of financial information, which facilitated the formulation and implementation of monetary and banking policies. Financial sector reforms continue under the supervision of the Central Bank. Financial intermediation has resumed, and as part of the modernisation of BCC, a software package for financial intermediation supervision was installed in 2007 ²⁷ . Various BCC departments are currently equipped with modern management and monitoring facilities
	- Legal System	N/A	
	- Support to Private Sector	N/A	
	- Environment	N/A	
	- Sectoral Capacity (Debt Management)	3	PANPURC's support first allowed the establishment of modern public debt management capacity. It made it easier to maintain OGEDEP as an autonomous structure, since this was a grant condition and the capacity building provided helped it significantly. The operation of the entire debt management system (OGEDEP, BCC, Treasury, etc.) was positively influenced by this development.
ii)	<u>Executing Agency</u>	3	

²⁷ Banking Supervision Application (BSA) software

EVALUATION CRITERIA			
No.	Component Indicators	Score (1 to 4)	REMARKS
	- Planning/Policy Analysis	3	SENAREC improved its capacity in the preparation of reports on the capacity building policy and its implementation, and is finalising PRONAREC, the main document in this area.
	- Management Control and Auditing	3	An accounting system was implemented. Project audits, which were timely, did not reveal any irregularities.
	- Training/Skills Upgrade	3	The SENAREC personnel received the training planned, and part of the staff trained is at post or has been replaced by officers with similar training. The ongoing preparation of PRONAREC in association with other departments and partners is also an excellent opportunity for skills development. One of the staff members has become a procurement specialist whose services are in demand for the implementation of other projects, as a consultant.
	- Technology Transfer	3	Technology transfer was satisfactory because of the training programmes provided with the assistance of consultants, on-the-job, at workshops and abroad, as well as the procurement of IT equipment.
	- Personnel Management (& staff turnover)	3	The appropriate personnel were assigned and training was provided. Recent strengthening of SENAREC staff numbers in connection with the preparation of PRONAREC, based on specific Terms of Reference.
	- Management Information System	2	Past activities resulted in the management system in place. Project audits revealed no abnormality.
	- Financial, Budget, Operations and Maintenance Systems	3	The audits, which were conducted on time, did not reveal any irregularities
	- Agency Restructuring	3	The institutional position of the Ministry of Planning and of SENAREC in capacity building was strengthened by the Ministry of Planning Order of 2009 and the 16 June 2009 Kinshasa Agenda on Aid Effectiveness
5	<u>Sustainability</u>	3	Probable
i)	<u>Technical Soundness</u>	3	The sustainability of the progress made in financial information and debt management is clear, but may be affected by the rapid obsolescence of the equipment, deficiencies in the electricity and computer networks, the fragility of the databases and the lack of long-term prospects for training. Continuity of the progress made is based on the assumption that the equipment and software will be better maintained and that there are medium and long-term prospects for staff training.
ii)	<u>Continued Borrower Commitment</u>	3	The Government's past and present capacity building commitments constitute a particularly positive factor for sustainability. This was confirmed through the PRONAREC 2011-2015 project, the June 2009 Kinshasa Agenda on Aid Effectiveness and the GPRSP. These commitments were boosted by those of donors including ADB, which directed substantial economic assistance flows to all sectors of activity.
iii)	<u>Socio-political Support</u>	2	Political instability has been partially reduced by the progress in civil peace and governance in the country, but it persists. Indeed, the widespread poverty of the majority of the population, public service mismanagement, extremely low wages and high turnover of civil servants, poor governance and corruption are negative factors for socio-political support. Decentralisation is likely to strengthen this support when it becomes effective.

EVALUATION CRITERIA			
No.	Component Indicators	Score (1 to 4)	REMARKS
iv)	<u>Economic Viability of the Programme</u>	N/A	
v)	<u>Financial Viability</u>	N/A	
vi)	<u>Institutional Arrangements</u>	3	There are positive developments for the sustainability of institutional arrangements, particularly with the adoption of the 2006 Constitution, which is a sustainable framework for organising capacity building. However, this sustainability is limited by weaknesses such as lack of coordination of national and international agencies, failure to make adequate provision for building local capacity and poor governance. To remedy these weaknesses, PRONAREC makes provision for resources and policies. The important role of the Ministry of Planning and SENAREC is also confirmed, thus allowing the use of these national agencies during implementation of PRONAREC.
vii	<u>Environmental Viability of the Programme</u>	N/A	.
viii	<u>Resilience to Exogenous Factors</u>	2	The capacity for resilience is limited in the face of exogenous factors such as terms of trade, world market prices or the political situation in the country and in neighbouring countries. Continued support from development partners is likely to absorb the shocks.
6	Aggregate Performance Indicator	3	The aggregate results as evaluated are satisfactory
National Capacity Building Programme Support Project (PANURC), DRC BORROWER'S PERFORMANCE			
No	Component Indicators	Score (1 to 4)	Observations
1.	<u>Quality of Preparation:</u>	3	The quality of preparation is satisfactory. The Government prepared PNURC with the support of UNDP and then presented it to partners including the Bank. SENAREC was closely involved in designing it. BCC and OGEDEP were also involved in preparing it and technical implementation units were also planned. Arrangements were made for the counterpart financing envisaged.
2.	<u>Quality of Implementation</u>	3	The quality of implementation is satisfactory overall.
3.	- Assignment of Key Staff	(4)	Key personnel were assigned. SENAREC operated with a light structure and generally well qualified staff (9 professional and support staff).
	- Management Performance of Executing Agency	(3)	SENAREC implemented its work programme, took initiatives and dialogued with the Bank. It developed its initially weak management capacity and familiarised itself with Bank rules. It complied with the procedures for the procurement of goods and services. However, the Steering Committee rarely met.
	- Use of Technical Assistance	(3)	The technical assistance was generally well utilised, particularly for computerization, and by BCC and OGEDEP (debt management expert). The national counterparts continued activities after the departure of the technical assistants.
	- Mid-Course Adjustments	(3)	Justified modifications were made to the duration of the contract of the experts and for increasing the operating budget, due to the project delays.
	- Adherence to Time Schedule	(1)	Completion occurred more than 30 months after its original date (31/12/2003). Adherence to the time schedule was unsatisfactory due to delays at start-up stemming from the

EVALUATION CRITERIA			
No.	Component Indicators	Score (1 to 4)	REMARKS
			insufficient training of managers and the slow response times of the Bank and the Government.
	- Adherence to Cost	3	Adherence to cost was fairly satisfactory because the overall project cost was not exceeded and contracts remained within the financial allocations fixed.
3.	<u>Compliance with Covenants</u>	<u>3</u>	Compliance with covenants is satisfactory. The terms and conditions of the Grant Agreement were generally fulfilled. The Government provided supplies, paid salaries and travel expenses for the various components.
4.	<u>Adequacy of Monitoring & Evaluation and Reporting</u>	<u>3</u>	The adequacy of monitoring/evaluation and reporting was satisfactory. Quarterly reports were produced regularly (14) and with improved quality over time. The audits showed the accuracy of the financial statements (two audits instead of 3). The Government's draft completion report was available on time.
5.	<u>Satisfactory Operations</u>	3	The project products and tools are being used by OGEDEP (debt management) BCC (financial statistics and computerization) and the Ministries (use of GPRSP and the seven studies conducted with support from the project.
	Overall Borrower Performance (Donee)	3	The Borrower's performance is satisfactory

National Capacity Building Programme Support Project (PANURC), DRC BANK'S PERFORMANCE		
Component Indicators	Score (1 to 4)	Observations
At Identification	3	Identification was conducted in June 1999 during an inter-agency dialogue mission on PNURC. At this preliminary stage, the Bank worked in close coordination with the Government and other donors, particularly UNDP, World Bank and the IMF.
At Preparation Stage	3	Preparation took place in November 1999 with the Congolese side and in coordination with other donors. In identifying the urgent needs, it took into account the country's fragile situation politically, economically and financially.
At Appraisal	3	Appraisal was conducted in February 2000 and January 2001, in coordination with development partners. It revised the financing estimates downwards to reflect the Bank's available resources. The drastic reduction of the grant initially planned resulted in limiting the number of studies and did not permit the procurement of all the equipment considered necessary for the ministries. The grant was indeed the most appropriate instrument for this low-income country. The project matrix should have had more indicators.
At Supervision	2	Six supervision missions were fielded over four years. There were delays in the issuing of some opinions and in the release of the revolving fund. Coordination with other partners was sustained
Overall Assessment of Bank performance	3	The Bank's performance was satisfactory

National Capacity Building Programme Support Project (PANURC), DRC

FACTORS AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE AND OUTCOME

Factors affecting positively (+) or negatively (-) the implementation and achievement of major objectives

Factors	Substantial	Partial	Negligible	N/A	Remarks
1. Not subject to Government Control					
1.1 World market prices	-				
1.2 Natural events	-				
1.3 Bank's Performance	+				
1.4 Performance of contractors/consultants	+				
1.5 Civil war	-				
1.6 Others (specify)				x	
2. Subject to Government Control					
2.1 Macroeconomic policies		+			
2.2 Sector policies		+			
2.3 Government commitment	+				
2.4 Appointment of key personnel	+				
2.5 Counterpart funding		+			
2.6 Administrative capacity	-				
2.7 Others (specify)				x	
3. Subject to Executing Agency Control					
3.1 Management	+				
3.2 Staffing	+				
3.3 Use of technical assistance	+				
3.4 Monitoring & Evaluation	+	+			
3.5 Beneficiary participation		+			
3.6 Others (specify)				x	
4- Factors Affecting Implementation					
4.1 Changes in project scope/scale/design		-			
4.2 Over-estimation/under-estimation of physical inputs, the base unit costs		-	-		
4.3 Inadequacy of price/physical contingencies				x	
4.4 Changes in exchange rates, in financial and institutional arrangements		-			
4.5 Unrealistic implementation schedule		-			
4.6 Quality of management including financial management		+			
4.7 Delays in selecting staff/consultants/contractors and in receiving counterpart funds		-			
4.8 Inefficient procurement and disbursement procedures		-			
4.9 Others (specify)				x	


RECOMMENDATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP MATRIX - PPER PANPURC/DRC		
Key Findings and Conclusions	Recommendations	Agency Responsible
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A fragile State, the DRC moved from a post-conflict phase to that of gradual improvement under a Government-led consolidation process, with the support of its development partners. The positive outcomes and impacts of PANPURC, which employed instruments such as grants, training, technical assistance and studies, which form part of those of the Fragile States Strategy (FSS), contributed to this consolidation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consolidate the DRC's passage from the post-conflict phase to that of gradual improvement, using the Bank's FSS instruments; taking into account, especially, the links between political objectives, security and development; improved operations of Government; implementation of macroeconomic reforms and growing donor support. Support Government to consolidate the gradual improvement phase, by assisting it to utilise the Bank's Fragile States Facility (FSF) for additional financing, clearing of debts and support targeted at human and institutional capacity building and knowledge management. The FSF will finance the assignment of resource persons and economic and sector work (ESW) on the various dimensions of the fragility, apart from the ESW financed on other resources. 	<p>Government</p> <p>ADB</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The success of capacity building projects depends on proper understanding of the phase the country is going through; consulting with the Government and the Bank to set clear priorities tailored to the needs of the country and its regions; targeting the institutions and systems that need strengthening and mobilising human resources. 	<p>Develop and maintain a study fund, based on the FSF and other resources and see to the archiving and dissemination of the studies conducted to ensure access to the institutional memory.</p> <p>Assist in FSF financing of ESWs on the dimensions of fragility, apart from the ESW financed on other resources.</p>	<p>Government</p> <p>ADB</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The success of capacity building projects depends on clear priorities that are tailored to the needs of the country and its regions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continue with decentralisation and build regional capacities, taking into account the paucity of local resources, especially in areas such as statistics, studies and planning, computerization and communication networks. Support Government efforts in decentralisation, in particular, to build regional capacities in statistics, studies and planning, and their access to computer networks. 	<p>Government</p> <p>ADB</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The success of capacity building projects depends on clear priorities and human resource mobilisation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Introduce appropriate policies on human resources and salaries, in the civil service especially, to address the problem of lack of staff motivation and prevent staff departures. Support Government's introduction of appropriate human resource and wage policies, for the civil service, especially. High-level officers should be involved in the work of a results-oriented public administration. 	<p>Government</p> <p>ADB</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Long-term capacity building of the public administration entails equally long-term efforts in training. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop training programmes designed to build national coordination and macroeconomic management capacities as part of a medium and long-term effort, taking into account the national training programme Build the Bank's capacities in training programmes designed to build national coordination and macroeconomic management capacities, as part of a medium and long-term effort, taking into account the national training 	<p>Government</p> <p>Bank</p>

RECOMMENDATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP MATRIX - PPER PANPURC/DRC		
Key Findings and Conclusions	Recommendations	Agency Responsible
	programme.	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Long-term capacity building of the public administration entails making efforts at modernisation over the long-term. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Encourage modernisation of public administration by focusing on computerization and setting up data transmission networks under a national ICT development strategy. This may be prepared and implemented with Bank support. The ICT strategy will: set forth the appropriate legal and regulatory framework; identify the appropriate ICT training needed; encourage the use of ICT by the State by way of online administration; develop communication networks and identify the major financing avenues for the ICT strategy. Support modernisation of public administration, which will entail computerization, and Government's formulation and implementation of an ICT development strategy. 	Government Bank
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Long-term capacity building of public administration calls for structural adjustments that will reflect changes in institutional systems and rules, as part of a long-term vision to achieve an efficient, results-based central administration, taking into account the need for decentralisation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop a long-term vision to build the capacities of a results-based public administration, fully recognising decentralisation as part of the process, as enshrined in the Constitution and under which PRONAREC will fall. Capacity building involves training and provision of equipment over the long term, and making changes in institutional rules and organisational systems. Support Government in preparing and implementing long-term national capacity building programmes, in particular, PRONAREC. To ensure sustained contribution to such programmes, each Bank project must be designed efficiently and implemented in inter-dependent short, medium and long-term stages. 	Government ADB
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of coordination in the country between capacity building projects like PANPURC, PAIM and PARER and Bank projects with a capacity building component adversely impacts their efficiency and sustainability. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop a more comprehensive project culture that includes the post-project phase (beyond the completion date) to promote the achievement of long-term project outcomes. The outcomes of past interventions such as PANPURC should be preserved and extended. 	Government
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Setting up an efficient national capacity-building body, provided with resources, competent staff and clear-cut responsibilities to coordinate activities is key to achieving immediate and medium and long-term goals of a national public administration modernisation programme, specifically capacity building. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintain the existence and guarantee the institutional viability of SENAREC as the national capacity building coordination body, so as to implement the ambitious national public administration modernisation programme, PRONAREC, which is being finalised. Dialogue between the Bank and the country should take into account the need to prolong PANPURC outcomes, in particular at BCC, OGEDEP and SENAREC. 	Government ADB

RECOMMENDATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP MATRIX - PPER PANPURC/DRC

Key Findings and Conclusions	Recommendations	Agency Responsible
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inadequate government coordination of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and weak alignment and harmonisation of development partners have fuelled dispersal and duplication of tasks, and lessened the impact of capacity building activities. This unsatisfactory situation stems from the absence of an integrated ODA programming and budgeting framework. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Promote coordination, ownership, alignment and harmonisation of capacity building activities of development partners and set up an integrated ODA framework, with Government as lead agency. Contribute to ownership, alignment and harmonisation of ODA in the DRC, with Government support for setting up an integrated ODA programming and budgeting framework. 	<p>Government</p> <p>ADB</p>

DRC – NATIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMME SUPPORT PROJECT (PANPURC)
INTERVENTION LOGICAL MODEL



RETROSPECTIVE MATRIX OF THE NATIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMME SUPPORT PROJECT (PANPURC/DRC) February 2010

HIERARCHY OF OBJECTIVES	EXPECTED OUTCOMES	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS				MEANS OF VERIFICATION	ASSUMPTIONS/ RISKS
		Title	Forecast	Actual (completion)	Actual (post-appraisal)		
PURPOSE/ Sector Goal	Long-term Outcomes						
Build national development management capacities	National development management capacities are built.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Long-term prospects - Development strategy - Medium-term national sector and regional development programmes - GPRSP - World Bank (WB) or ADB CPIA indicators - WB quality of public financial management indicator - WB or ADB CPA indicators - WB or ADB country governance indicators - Paris Declaration (PD) monitoring indicators: operationnality of the development strategy; % technical cooperation coordinated with national programmes; % 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A 2030 DRC prospective study will soon be launched - Government economic programme (2009-2012) - CPIA, CPA and governance (WB/ADB) indicators show governance to be unsatisfactory despite improvements. CPIA 2008=2.8; CPA=2.9 - WB indicator on quality of public budget and finance management: 2.0 in 2005 and 2006, 2.5 in 2008 - PD indicator of operational nature of country's development strategy (Scale of A to E): Score: D in 2005 and 2007. - PD indicator of % of technical cooperation coordinated with national programmes: 2006, 11% support to capacity building; 38% in 2007, - PD indicator of availability of a performance evaluation framework (scale of D to E): D in 2005 and 2007 - Transparency International's 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranked DRC 168th out of 179 countries - Doing Business 2009: DRC ranked 182nd out of 183 countries - DRC's Human Development Index for 2007 was 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Programme Documents Various programmes and projects with bilateral and multilateral donors Reports by development partners, including UNDP, WB, IMF, OECD, and ADB I-PRSP, GPRSP PNURC, ADB or WB CPIA and CPA documents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Risks have reduced, but remain: (i) political instability in country and region, with rebel presence; (ii) regionalisation and decentralisation difficulties; (iii) lack of motivation on part of public service officers and massive departure of trained staff; (iv) poor governance, poor coordination within public administration and its inability to implement activities; (v) slackening efforts at reform will aggravate external resource mobilization difficulties; (vi) lack of coordination among development partners. Mitigative measures are needed to achieve project objectives.

RETROSPECTIVE MATRIX OF THE NATIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMME SUPPORT PROJECT (PANPURC/DRC) February 2010

HIERARCHY OF OBJECTIVES	EXPECTED OUTCOMES	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS				MEANS OF VERIFICATION	ASUMPTIONS/ RISKS
		Title	Forecast	Actual (completion)	Actual (post-appraisal)		
		assistance to public sector in programme approaches; availability of performance evaluation framework. - Doing Business ranking (WB) - Corruption ranking by Transparency International - HDI (UNDP) - GDP growth			0.389, and the country ranked 176 th out of 182 countries - GDP growth rate: 6.3% in 2007, 6.2% en 2008, 2.7% en 2009.		
Project Goal and Objectives	Medium-term Outcomes						
Support the emergence of minimum institutional capacity in	INDIRECT IMPACT National coordination and	Post-conflict development programme approved	Programme agreed with Bretton Woods	Economic programme (2002-2005) under PRGF	- PRGF 2002-2005 and 2010-2012 signed with IMF - Financial cooperation restored with Bretton Woods institutions, the Bank and other donors.	I-PRSP et GPRSP Project reports;	- Political instability of the country; lack of motivation on the part

RETROSPECTIVE MATRIX OF THE NATIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMME SUPPORT PROJECT (PANPURC/DRC) February 2010

HIERARCHY OF OBJECTIVES	EXPECTED OUTCOMES	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS				MEANS OF VERIFICATION	ASUMPTIONS/ RISKS
		Title	Forecast	Actual (completion)	Actual (post-appraisal)		
planning and macroeconomic management	macroeconomic capacities are improved	by partners	institutions from 2002 Programme concluded with Bretton Woods Institutions up to 2012	- Financial cooperation restored with Bretton Woods institutions and other donors and multinationals	Bretton Woods, Bank and other donors - I-PRSP (2002) - PMURR (2002) implemented the I-PRSP and served as the framework for partners' intervention during the emergency/transition phase.	Truth and Reconciliation Commission reports; Various DRC websites; Reports of IMF, WB, ADB and other international organisations PAP implementation report Ministry of Planning and Government reports Reports by development partners, including UNDP, WB, IMF, EU and ADB SENAREC report on PNURC and PRONAREC	of public officers, due to low salaries and massive staff departures; poor governance; poor coordination within public administration and its inability to implement activities - Slackening efforts made at reform will aggravate external resource mobilisation difficulties; -Lack of coordination among development partners.
		Other national programmes and with partners	-	-	- PMPTR (Oct. 2004) aimed at a successful transition; country assistance framework 2007; priority action programmes implemented - GPRSP 2006-2008; medium-term priority programme (2007-2011); PRONAREC 2008-2012 being finalised.		
		- Institutional position of Min. of Planning and SENAREC and their capacities - Ministry of Planning capacities - SENAREC capacities	Institutional position of Ministry of Planning and SENAREC strengthened	Institutional position of Ministry of Planning and SENAREC not much strengthened	- Institutional role of Ministry of Planning and SENAREC in capacity building, consolidated by the Kinshasa Agenda (June 2009) on aid efficiency - Ministry of Planning capacities remain weak - SENAREC capacities have been strengthened		
		- Number of development partners	Number of development partners increased	- World Bank, IMF, EU, UNDP, Belgium, France, etc....	- About 20 development partners are in cooperation with the DRC. They include ADB, WB, IMF, EU, UNDP, Belgium, France and Canada; - Consultative groups have met several times since 2001.		
		- External financing for capacity building	- External financing for capacity building	- Commitments of USD 511million from partners for capacity building	- Out of the USD 511 million of commitments from partners for capacity building, USD 208 million of the USD511 million was released from 2001 to 2004, including USD 35 million (17%) to PNURC		
		EFFECTS DIRECTS					
- Reliability of monetary and banking	- Quality of reports produced by BCC; - Increased number	- Quality of statistics and reports produced	Publications are being improved	- BCC publications more reliable (August 2009): "Summary Statistical Information"; "Recent Economic Trends", and "Economic Outlook", which all contain	BCC reports; Quarterly project implementation	motivation on part of public officers, due to low salaries and staff	

RETROSPECTIVE MATRIX OF THE NATIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMME SUPPORT PROJECT (PANPURC/DRC) February 2010

HIERARCHY OF OBJECTIVES	EXPECTED OUTCOMES	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS				MEANS OF VERIFICATION	ASUMPTIONS/ RISKS
		Title	Forecast	Actual (completion)	Actual (post-appraisal)		
	statistics are improved	of publications on banking and monetary statistics - Quality of content and operation of BCC website; - Availability of monetary and banking statistics - Dissemination of monetary and banking statistics - Quality of BCC databases - Government financial operations table - Balance of payments	by improved BCC	More reliable and timely monetary and banking statistics available	useful and recent information for 2009. - Content of BCC website. Public finance, external sector, currency and credit, monthly and annual inflation rate, daily exchange rate, interest rate, etc. - Availability of monetary and banking statistics: three months previously, to one or two weeks currently, in some cases. - Reliability of monitoring indicators by the IMF staff monitored programme (SMP) in 2009: uneven quality. - Dissemination of monetary and banking statistics: Limited distribution of publications and irregular functioning of website; - Uneven quality of BCC databases: macroeconomic and financial databases; Bank operations database, etc. - Government financial operations table: balance of payments: gaps diminishing gradually	reports Various DRC websites Reports of IMF, WB, ADB and other international organisations	departures; poor governance; poor coordination within public administration and its inability to implement activities - Slackening reform efforts t will aggravate external resource mobilisation difficulties; -Lack of coordination among development partners.
	- Debt management is improved	- Agreement with partners on debt - Operation of a database on debt and its quality - Debt stock - Number and amount of loans entered. - Availability of statistics and publications on debt - Quality of data on external debt servicing - Quality of data on	Agreement of all development partners on amount of DRC's external debt	Agreement by all development partners on amount of DRC's external debt. Reliable computerized management system; management system for public debt and external aid	- Agreement in 2003 with partners on amount of external debt. As at 31/12/2008 (Source: OGEDEP), The debt is USD12.075 billion (external debt USD10.785 billion; domestic debt USD1.289 billion); - Proper operation of debt database: DMFAS database has been operating since 2005, and updated regularly; - Number and amounts of loans entered. In 2009, DMFAS captured 95% of the external debt, broken down into 220 agreements; - Period: Statistics available within days for aggregates, as opposed to several months in the past. More regular publications. - Narrowing external debt stock assessment gaps: In 2007, IMF assessed this at USD12 billion, while OGEDEP assessed it at USD11.2. in 2004, the assessment gap was wider;	OGEDEP activity reports and statistics bulletins OGEDEP website Reports of IMF, WB, Reports of IMF, WB, ADB and other international organisations	

RETROSPECTIVE MATRIX OF THE NATIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMME SUPPORT PROJECT (PANPURC/DRC) February 2010

HIERARCHY OF OBJECTIVES	EXPECTED OUTCOMES	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS				MEANS OF VERIFICATION	ASSUMPTIONS/ RISKS
		Title	Forecast	Actual (completion)	Actual (post-appraisal)		
		domestic debt - OGEDEP/IMF debt assessment gaps - Reaching HIPCI decision and completion points - List of publications on debt - OGEDEP status - Debt management procedures manual			- Quality of data on debt service: inadequate, given OGEDEP's lack of information from the institutions responsible for disbursement; - Data on domestic debt not well managed - Reaching HIPCI decision and completion points. Decision point in July 2003 and completion point slated for 2010 or 2011; - List of reliable publications on debt has improved: Statistical bulletin on public debt (OGEDEP, 1 and 2, October 2009); IMF publications - Availability of statistics on portfolio structure of the debt, debt stock and debt service from 2005 to 2008; - Projections of external debt service (2009 to 2018 available) - Maintaining OGEDEP as an autonomous institution - Preparation of a DMFAS procedures manual		
	- PRSP is prepared using a participatory process	- Poverty reduction programme documents - List of studies conducted	- Poverty reduction programme documents - List of studies conducted	- Active contribution to GPRSP's preparation	- I-PRSP 2002-05 and GPRSP 2006-08 were adopted in June 2002 and July 2006, respectively, with PANPURC's contribution - The project conducted seven studies to prepare the GPRSP (9 months, 12 national consultants)	Project reports; I-PRSP and GPRSP ; Various DRC websites ; Reports of IMF, WB, ADB and other international organisations	
	- Institutional framework for policy and reform coordination is strengthened	- The four technical secretariats of the inter-ministerial committees (IMC) and other coordinating agencies are strengthened	- The four IMC technical secretariats and other coordinating agencies strengthened	- The four IMC technical secretariats and other coordinating agencies strengthened	- The four IMC technical secretariats were strengthened, and subsequently dissolved at the end of the emergency period - Other agencies responsible for the alignment of sector programmes with the macroeconomic framework were strengthened - Programmes and policies were formulated with the contribution of these agencies	Project and Government reports Programmes and policies were formulated with the contribution of these agencies	

RETROSPECTIVE MATRIX OF THE NATIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMME SUPPORT PROJECT (PANPURC/DRC) February 2010

HIERARCHY OF OBJECTIVES	EXPECTED OUTCOMES	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS				MEANS OF VERIFICATION	ASUMPTIONS/ RISKS
		Title	Forecast	Actual (completion)	Actual (post-appraisal)		
		- Strengthened SENAREC	- Strengthened SENAREC	The strengthened SENAREC has 9 officers and support staff, including the Coordinator, Deputy Coordinator, and 2 programme officers	- Strengthened SENAREC. This strengthening was per the Orders issued by the Minster of in March and September 2009. National consultants were recruited to prepare PRONAREC. SENAREC staff comprises about 20 officers, support personnel and consultants.		
ACTIVITIES							
- Prepare training and equipment plans for coordinating agencies	- The four IMC technical secretariats, CTCPM and the offices of the Ministers of Finance and Planning are strengthened with equipment and training	- No. of persons trained - Equipment delivered			- Participants of these institutions in IT training, e-view training, debt management training, GPRSP. Two CTCPM officers trained in processing and analysis of mining resources - Equipment obtained by the 4 secretariats and the offices of the Ministers of Finance and Planning: 25 computers, 19 printers, 3 photocopy machines, 1 vehicle. Equipment received by CTCPM: 4 computers specialised GDM software, 4 printers, 1 vehicle, 1 photocopy machine.	PANPURC project reports List of workshops List of equipment	- Lack of motivation of public officers and massive departure of trained staff - Poor governance, poor coordination within public administration and its inability to implement activities ; - Lack of coordination of partner interventions
- Prepare training and equipment plans (computers, etc.) to improve reliability of monetary and banking statistics.	- Training and provision of equipment (computers, etc.) help build the capacities of BCC	- Number of officers trained at BCC - Equipment and software supplied to BCC	- Number and quality of reports produced by BCC	- Quarterly and annual reports - Reliable and timely monetary and banking statistics available	- BCC training plan prepared and implemented - 192 BCC participants at five workshops on inter-bank computerized networking; 54 BCC participants (and other institutions) trained in E-views; BCC participants at 3 workshops on debt management. About 100 BCC officers trained to handle financial intermediation, better exchange control, efficiency in taking into account and processing economic, financial and monetary statistics. - Fifty (50) PCs and laptops, 16 printers supplied by the project to BCC. BCC is supplied with the E-views software	BCC reports; Quarterly project implementation reports Various DRC websites Reports of IMF, WB, ADB and other international organisations	

RETROSPECTIVE MATRIX OF THE NATIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMME SUPPORT PROJECT (PANPURC/DRC) February 2010

HIERARCHY OF OBJECTIVES	EXPECTED OUTCOMES	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS				MEANS OF VERIFICATION	ASUMPTIONS/ RISKS
		Title	Forecast	Actual (completion)	Actual (post-appraisal)		
- Enhance technical assistance, training, equipment (computers, etc.) and software to improve public debt management.	- Technical assistance, training, equipment (computers, etc.) and software, capacity built to improve public debt management.	- DMFAS database - Equipment (including computers) supplied - DMFAS software supplied - Manual of procedures - Workshops and training organised	- Agreement by all development partners on DRC's external debt amount	- All development partners agree on DRC's external debt amount - Reliable computerized management system and for public debt and external aid	- One (1) international expert in management and use of DMFAS recruited for 18 months; UNCTAD technical assistance during procurement of DMFAS version 5. - DMFAS debt database is set up in 2005 and operates well; DMFAS manual of procedures. - A training plan prepared for OGEDEP and implemented - Twenty (20) people (including 2 in Geneva) trained in DMFAS software - Several other training programmes: 24 workers trained in office management; 140 OGEDEP participants (and others) at 3 workshops on debt administration and debt monitoring techniques - Twelve (12) PCs and laptop computers for OGEDEP; 1 OGEDEP vehicle	BCC reports OGEDEP activity reports and statistical bulletins Project quarterly and other reports OGEDEP website Reports of IMF, WB, ADB and other international organisations	
- Studies, training and equipment (computers, etc.) support for preparation of GPRSP.	- Studies, training, equipment (computers, etc.) are used in preparation of GPRSP.	- Studies conducted - GPRSP prepared	Poverty reduction programme document	- Active contribution to poverty reduction programme	- Seven studies for GPRSP and preparation of plans: 9 months, 12 national consultants - GPRSP prepared in July 2006- - 160 participants attended 3 workshops and thematic seminars on GPRSP preparation - Technical departments of sector ministries (UPPE/DSRP, DEP/ESU, DEP/TPI, DEP/Health, Dis/EPSP) equipped: 5 vehicles, 8 computers, 8 printers, 5 photocopiers, 6 air-conditioners	Project reports; I-PRSP and GPRSP; Various DRC websites; Reports of IMF, WB, ADB and other international organisations	
- Training and equipment support for SENAREC	- SENAREC receives training and equipment support	- No. of people trained at SENAREC Equipment delivered to SENAREC			Preparation and implementation of SENAREC training plan - Persons trained: 8 officers (3 of whom have left) participated in training workshops on project management, procurement, operational planning, project audit and the GPRSP - Equipment: 6 computers, 2 printers, 3 vehicles, etc. - Specialised GIN accounting software procured for SENAREC	Project reports; Project annual audit reports; I-PRSP and GPRSP;	

ACTIVITIES	INPUTS						
	Financing Human resources	Financing carried out Human resources assigned	Financing: TAF: MUA 1.97 CIDA: MUA 0.30 Govt: MUA 0.46 Total: MUA 2.73		Financing: TAF: UA 1.64 million; CIDA: UA 0.30 million; Government: UA 0.46 million; Total: UA 2.4 million Consultants: One (1) international consultant in debt management (18 months); one (1) consulting firm for computer training; 12 national consultants for GPRSP studies. Completion with 30 months' delay Balance: UA 0.33 million of TAF grant and overrun of 32% of project operational costs	Project activity and supervision reports; Project completion report; List of project workshops; List of project equipment	- Limited motivation of public officers and massive departure of trained staff - Poor governance, poor coordination within public administration and its inability to implement activities ; - Lack of coordination of partner interventions.

EVALUATION MATRIX OF THE DRC PANPURC PPER

TYPE OF QUESTION	EVALUATION QUESTIONS		ASSESSMENT CRITERIA	INFORMATION AND INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION	METHODS
	QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS				
Relevance and Quality at Entry	1. To what extent have the various CSPs and Bank programmes included capacity building as a priority?	1.1 To what extent does the capacity building content of the CSPs take into account the DRC's capacity building needs?	Status of inclusion of capacity building in CSPs and the DRC's development strategies and policies from 2000 to 2009	List of DRC strategy and policy documents covering capacity building policies and objectives and quality of their analysis in this area List of CSPs and quality of their content and analysis of capacity building. List of Bank policy documents on capacity building % of DRC and CSP financial resources for capacity building	Min. of Plan, Min. of Finance (Treasury, Budget Preparation and Monitoring) Civil Service Min; the beneficiaries, SENAREC, ADB Regional Office ADB Regional Office, ADB National Capacity Building Programme (PNURC) and capacity building process in the DRC (Jul. 2003), GPRSP 2003 and GPRSP 2006 and other govt documents on the capacity situation. CSP 1999-2001, 2005-07, 2008-12 and relevant Bank documents Bank Medium-Term Strategy, 2008-2012; Bank Strategy for Fragile States (2008): Inventory of Donor Approaches to Capacity Development. OECD/DAC ADB and DRC loans for capacity building, 2000-09 Other relevant reports of the Government, the Bank and beneficiaries	Collecting documents, Literature review, Working sessions, Interviews Questionnaire Field visit
		1.2 What is the trend of the capacity and capacity building needs of beneficiaries	Existing capacity and capacity building needs of beneficiaries, 2000- 2009	Number, qualification and distribution of human resources (incl. Senior staff and women) Annual financial resources (budget appropriations and international cooperation, including ADB); IT equipment		
		1.3 To what extent has the Bank aligned the objectives of PANPURC with those of PNURC?	Alignment of the objectives of PNURC with those of PANPURC	List of PNURC and PANPURC key objectives Degree of alignment of each PANPURC key objective		Literature review, Document review, Working sessions and interviews

EVALUATION MATRIX OF THE DRC PANPURC PPER

TYPE OF QUESTION	EVALUATION QUESTIONS		ASSESSMENT CRITERIA	INFORMATION AND INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION	METHODS
	QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS				
Relevance and Quality at Entry	2. What was the quality of the project design, particularly in terms of risk assessment and strategies to address it?	2.1 What was the quality at entry of PANPURC?	Level of adaptation of instruments used in the situation of a post-crisis fragile State	List of instruments	Min. of Plan, Min. of Finances; Beneficiaries SENAREC, ADB Regional Office, ADB DRC Capacity Building Process (Jul. 2003), CSP 1999-2001, 2005-07, 2008-12; Bank Strategy for Fragile States(2008): PANPURC (preparation, appraisal and completion reports)	Collecting of documents, Literature review, Working sessions and interviews
				Quality of the performance monitoring and logical framework, particularly list and quality of indicators		
			Level of country ownership of the National Capacity Building Project and PANPURC	Method of determining project objectives and level of involvement in its implementation and monitoring		
		2.2 Is the quality of the risk analysis and mitigative measures adequate in light of the project's identified and unidentified risks?	Key identified and unidentified risks and measures to mitigate such risks during project design and quality of analysis (limitations and relevance).	List of key identified and unidentified risks, in particular those related to national reconciliation, governance and staff stability		
		List of key mitigative measures, particularly, capacity building, structural reforms and staff incentives (salaries)				
	3. To what extent has coordination with bilateral and multilateral partners contributed to obtaining the desired results?	3.1 To what extent has the project, being integrated into PNURC, a programme financed by several development partners, more effectively concentrated its efforts in limited areas of activity?	Coordination of key partners for the National Capacity Building Programme	List of development partners and their areas of intervention, particularly in capacity building	Min. of Plan, Min. of Finance, Min. for Co-operation), SENAREC development partners, including UNDP, WB, IMF, ACBF, EU, CIDA ADB Regional Office 2008 Survey on Monitoring	Collecting documents, Literature review, Working sessions and interviews
		Resource level of partners for the Natl. Capacity Building Programme and areas of intervention				

EVALUATION MATRIX OF THE DRC PANPURC PPER

TYPE OF QUESTION	EVALUATION QUESTIONS		ASSESSMENT CRITERIA	INFORMATION AND INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION	METHODS
	QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS				
Relevance and Quality at Entry				Comparing the PANPURC outcomes with those of PAIM and PARER, which did not receive the same donor coordination Paris Declaration implementation indicators and level of coordination	the Paris Declaration-OECD, PANPURC, PAIM and PARER completion reports, other Government and development partners' reports	
	4. To what extent can the PANPURC intervention have reinforcing (or obstructive) effects with other Bank projects?	4.1 Have the interventions of PANPURC contributed directly or indirectly to the objectives of other Bank projects?	Bank projects in the DRC with a capacity building component, such as PAIM and PARER	List of Bank projects in the DRC, their resources and capacity building content	ADB Regional Office, SENAREC, Coordinators of other ADB projects, Reports on PAIM and PARER	Collecting of documents, Literature review, Working sessions Interviews
		4.2 Have the interventions of other Bank projects contributed directly or indirectly to the objectives of PANPURC?	Bank projects in the DRC with a capacity building component, such as PAIM and PARER	4.2.1 Status of Bank projects in the DRC, their resources and capacity building content		
	5. To what extent did the Bank incorporate the crosscutting gender aspect into the design and implementation of PANPURC?	5.1 Were sufficient numbers of women trained by the project, and was the quality good?	Women trained by the project	Number and qualification of women trained by the project	Min. of Planning, Min. of Finance, SENAREC; BCC ADB Regional Office training reports, other government reports	Collecting of documents, Literature review, Working sessions, Interviews; Questionnaires
		5.2 Does the I-PRSP contain women-oriented policies and programmes?	Women-oriented policies recommended by the I-PRSP	Women-oriented policy documents recommended by the I-PRSP		
	6. To what extent did the Bank's assistance under the project contribute to improving the reliability of banking and monetary statistics and the automation of financial	6.1 To what extent did the Bank's assistance under the project contribute to improving the reliability of banking and monetary statistics?	Reliability of banking and monetary statistics	List and issue date, since 2001, of BCC and INS publications on banking and monetary statistics; List of IMF publications with banking and monetary statistics on the	Min. of Planning, Min. of Finance, BCC, Government (BCC, INS, Treasury, SENAREC), School of Finance, Centre for the Coordination of Development Training	Collecting of documents, Literature review, Working sessions, Interviews

EVALUATION MATRIX OF THE DRC PANPURC PPER

TYPE OF QUESTION	EVALUATION QUESTIONS		ASSESSMENT CRITERIA	INFORMATION AND INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION	METHODS
	QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS				
Relevance and Quality at Entry	information?			DRC List and current and past frequency of dissemination of banking and monetary indicators; Timeliness and quality of indicators Quality of reports on monetary and banking statistics (IMF report)	(CENACOF) reports; IMF, WB, UNDP, ADB Government, IMF, WB, SENAREC, ADB reports, IMF report on data quality	Field visits to BCC, Min. of Finance, INS Questionnaire s
		6.2 To what extent did the Bank’s assistance under the project contribute to improving the BCC’s performance?	Use of IT tools and improved automation of financial information	Number of BCC professional and support staff trained and using IT tools List of applications and reports using IT tools Reduction in reporting and service times		
			Use of EVIEWS software	Number of BCC officers trained and using Eviews. List of applications and reports using Eviews		
			Persons trained and their assignment	Number, qualification and assignment of persons trained by the project Number and qualification of staff trained who changed positions at BCC or who left		

EVALUATION MATRIX OF THE DRC PANPURC PPER

TYPE OF QUESTION	EVALUATION QUESTIONS		ASSESSMENT CRITERIA	INFORMATION AND INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION	METHODS
	QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS				
Relevance and Quality at Entry			Upgrade of stock of IT equipment provided (BCC) with the Bank's assistance, and its current use	IT equipment provided by the project, its condition and use		
	7. To what extent did the Bank's assistance under the project contributed to improving debt management?	7.1 To what extent did the project contribute to improving skills in debt management methods?	Quality and timeliness of reports and statistics on domestic and foreign debts	List of publications and debt indicators since 2001; publishers and recent indicators	Min. of Planning, Min. of Finance, BCC, Government (BCC, INS, Treasury, SENAREC), School of Finance, Centre for the Coordination of Development Training (CENACOF), IMF, WB, UNDP reports; Government, IMF, WB, SENAREC reports	Literature review, document review, Working sessions and interviews, Field visit, OGEDEP Questionnaire
				Number and amounts of loans and agreements entered		
				Time for processing files		
				Quality of reports and statistics on domestic and foreign debt		
		Training of professional and support staff in debt management	List and content of seminars, workshops and others on debt management			
			Number, qualification and initial and current assignment of OGEDEP staff trained by the project for debt management and using the training acquired			
			Number and qualification of staff trained in debt management who changed positions or left OGEDEP			

EVALUATION MATRIX OF THE DRC PANPURC PPER

TYPE OF QUESTION	EVALUATION QUESTIONS		ASSESSMENT CRITERIA	INFORMATION AND INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION	METHODS
	QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS				
		7.2 To what extent did the project contribute to the development of the IT skills and capabilities necessary for improved debt management	Computer training by the project for debt management	Number of professional and support staff trained in IT by the project for debt management and making use of the training acquired		
			Past/present assignment of staff	Past/present assignment of staff trained in IT by the project		
			Computer hardware and other equipment (OGEDEP) put in place by the project	Quantity, state, allocation and use of computer hardware and other equipment put in place (OGEDEP)		
				Software installed and its use (DMFAS; others)		
	8. To what extent did the Bank's assistance under the project contribute to preparing the PRSP through a participatory process?	8.1 What is the project's contribution in terms of relevant economic and sector work for preparation of the PRSP?	Studies conducted for the GPRSP and preparation of plans by the project	List and content of studies conducted for the GPRSP and preparation of plans by the project	Government, SENAREC, World Bank and IMF reports, Department responsible for the PRSP and its monitoring PCR, GPRSP	Collecting documents, document review, Working sessions Interviews
		8.2 Training on the participatory approach	Professional and support staff involved in the participatory preparation	Number and distribution of professional and support staff involved in the participatory preparation		
	9. To what extent did the Bank's assistance under the project contribute to improving policy formulation,	9.1 To what extent did policy formulation, implementation and evaluation improve?	Improving policy formulation, implementation and evaluation	List of areas of improvement for policy formulation, implementation and evaluation	Min. of Planning, Min. of Finance, BCC Department responsible for the PRSP and its monitoring, CTCPM SENAREC, IMF,	Collecting documents, Literature review, Working

EVALUATION MATRIX OF THE DRC PANPURC PPER						
TYPE OF QUESTION	EVALUATION QUESTIONS		ASSESSMENT CRITERIA	INFORMATION AND INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION	METHODS
	QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS				
Efficiency	Implementation and evaluation?			Number, list, frequency and quality of reports produced by the agencies involved (GPRSP, national and sector development plans and programmes)	WB, UNDP Regional Office, Government, SENAREC, World Bank, and IMF reports, PCR, GPRSP and other programming and planning documents of the ministries concerned	Sessions Interviews
				Improved preparation and implementation of the Finance Act		
				Improved management of mining through the CTCPM (Technical Unit for Mining Coordination and Planning) IT networks		
				CPIA indicators and criteria (WB/ADB)		
	9.2 What was the quality of inputs such as technical assistants and the consistency of activities with objectives?	Work and training plans prepared by the technical assistants	List and content of work prepared and implemented by the technical assistants	List, content and quality of training implemented by the technical assistants		
		IT equipment of the departments concerned	Number of officers and support staff that benefitted from skills transfer by the technical assistants	Number and quality of IT equipment and level of supervision		

EVALUATION MATRIX OF THE DRC PANPURC PPER

TYPE OF QUESTION	EVALUATION QUESTIONS		ASSESSMENT CRITERIA	INFORMATION AND INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION	METHODS
	QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS				
Efficiency		9.3 To what extent did the project improve the country's capacity, in the project areas of impact, in identifying its needs, formulating actions tailored to those needs and developing institutional capacity	Identification of country's needs and corresponding appropriate actions	Quality of identification of country needs and corresponding actions in key policy, planning and programming documents prepared		
			Identification, development and strengthening of institutional capacity to meet the country's needs	List of institutional capacity identified Quality of identification of institutional capacity and ways and means of strengthening and developing it		
		9.4 What were the factors affecting negatively or positively the implementation and achievement of objectives, the assumptions and risks identified at appraisal and the mitigative measures taken during project implementation	Status of relevant factors (annexes)	List of factors identified		
	10. What were the unexpected project impacts?	Unexpected impact	Unexpected impact	List of unexpected project impacts	Min. of Planning, Min. of Finance, BCC, CTCPM, SENAREC, IMF, WB, UNDP Regional Office Government, World Bank, IMF, ADB and other reports	Collecting documents, Literature review, Working sessions, Interviews
	11. What progress was made towards achievement	11.1 Economic and socio-economic level	Macro-cosmic and socio-economic indicators	Economic growth and per capita economic growth	Min. of Planning, Min. of Finance, BCC, CTCPM,	Collecting of documents

EVALUATION MATRIX OF THE DRC PANPURC PPER

TYPE OF QUESTION	EVALUATION QUESTIONS		ASSESSMENT CRITERIA	INFORMATION AND INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION	METHODS
	QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS				
	of the overall development objectives of the project, within the country context?			<p>Socio-economic context indicators (poverty rate, literacy and school enrolment rate, life expectancy, connectivity to internet, number of computers, etc.)</p> <p>Public sector performance indicators: Wage bill (% of GDP) and civilian employment (% population and employment), CPIA public sector management and governance indicators, corruption and aid dependency indicators (% of GDP)</p>	INS, SENAREC, IMF, WB, UNDP ADB Regional Office Government, INS, World Bank, IMF, UNDP, ADB and others	Literature review, Working sessions Interviews
Efficiency	12. Were the project outcomes obtained at a cost consistent with projections and comparable to best practices of the Bank?	12.1 Were the human resources allocated in line with the standards of other similar Bank projects?	Human resources. Manpower recruited from project financing, including international experts (number and expertise, estimates and actual).	Quantity and cost of human resources. Manpower recruited from project financing, including international experts (number and expertise, estimates and actual).	Project Coordination Unit and relevant ADB, Government and SENAREC departments	Collecting of documents, Literature review, Interviews
		12.2 Was the cost of equipment procured in line with standards in other countries or in the Bank?	Equipment, including computer hardware and software, including their allocation and initial and current use; estimates and actual	Provision of equipment, including computer hardware and software, including their allocation and initial and current use; estimates and actual		

EVALUATION MATRIX OF THE DRC PANPURC PPER

TYPE OF QUESTION	EVALUATION QUESTIONS		ASSESSMENT CRITERIA	INFORMATION AND INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION	METHODS
	QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS				
		12.3 Were the financial resources utilised lower or higher than the resources provided?	Financial resources mobilised by the project by recipient	Amount of financial resources mobilised by the project by recipient and resources' distribution by donor; estimates and actual		
		12.4 Was the project implemented according to the plan and schedule planned?	Allocation and utilisation of resources and outputs	Allocation of Bank resources according to the agencies concerned Project's estimated and actual timetable Use of equipment and outputs		
	13. To what extent did the administrative procedures for financing and managing project activities help or hinder achievement of the intended outcomes?	13.1 To what extent did procedures for allocating the grant resources, disbursement and procurement facilitate or hamper achievement of outcomes?	Project implementation Disbursement	Project implementation timeframes and delays Timeframes and delays	Government, SENAREC, ADB, Regional Office The departments concerned, particularly the finance departments The relevant project documents	Collecting documents, Literature review, Working sessions Interviews
Sustainability	14. To what extent did the Bank's assistance help to develop sustainable capacity and achieve sustainable outcomes?	14.1 To what extent did the project contribute to creating sustainable capacity among the beneficiaries?	Improved supervision of departments concerned and stability of senior and support staff trained	Trend and prospects of supervision of departments concerned. Initial and current assignment of senior and support staff trained with project support Monitoring, retraining and enhanced career development of officers and support staff trained	Government, SENAREC, ADB, Regional Office, beneficiaries, development partners Beneficiaries Development partners SENAREC reports	Collecting of documents, Literature review, Working sessions, Interviews

EVALUATION MATRIX OF THE DRC PANPURC PPER

TYPE OF QUESTION	EVALUATION QUESTIONS		ASSESSMENT CRITERIA	INFORMATION AND INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION	METHODS
	QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS				
			Availability of equipment for departments concerned and assignment	Trend and prospects of availability of equipment for departments concerned. Initial and current assignment and working condition of equipment installed with project support Human, material and financial resources for maintenance and replacement of equipment		
		14.2 Did the project contribute to ownership and commitment by nationals?	Financial resources of departments concerned Development and collaboration with national and development partners.	Trend of financial resources of the departments concerned, including from Government and development partners Development of collaboration with local partners Development of collaboration with development partners		
		14.3 What procedures and systems support or could have better support project sustainability?	Procedure and support systems	List of national support policies, reforms and motivation that could better support the project. Salaries and wages		
		14.4. Do the successes and failures identified suggest additional stages to achieve the development objectives more efficiently and effectively	Other stages of project envisaged	Description of future stages of the project		

EVALUATION MATRIX OF THE DRC PANPURC PPER

TYPE OF QUESTION	EVALUATION QUESTIONS		ASSESSMENT CRITERIA	INFORMATION AND INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION	METHODS
	QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS				
Institutional Development Impact	15. To what extent did the project contribute to improvement and changes in norms and practices (institutional capacity, policy framework) that allow the country to better utilise its human, financial and natural resources	15.1 To what extent did the project correctly identify the institutions involved in its implementation and support?	Role of implementing institutions?	Contribution of implementing institutions	Government, SENAREC, ADB, Regional Office, Beneficiaries, Development partners Beneficiaries Development partners SENAREC, Government and development partners' reports	Collecting documents, Literature review, Working sessions, Interviews
		15.2 To what extent did the project develop institutional capacity and the policy framework envisaged at appraisal for planning, management and professional staff development?	Policy framework for planning, management and professional staff development	Availability and quality of policy framework for planning, management and professional staff development		
Borrower's Performance	16. To what extent was there shared responsibility and accountability of local partners and beneficiaries for project implementation and outcomes?	16.1 To what extent did local partners and beneficiaries participate in project design, implementation and monitoring?	Participation of local partners and beneficiaries	Number and quality of local partners and beneficiaries that participated in project design, implementation and monitoring	Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning, ADB, SENAREC, Regional Office Government, SENAREC and development partners' reports.	Collecting documents, Literature review, Working sessions, Interviews
		16.2 To what extent did the project create new partnerships that facilitated the achievement of results?	New partnerships	Number and quality of new partnerships		
Bank's Performance	17. To what extent did the Bank play its role in all phases of the project cycle?	17.1 To what extent did the Bank play its role in project identification, preparation, appraisal, launching and supervision?	Bank commitment	Degree of Bank commitment at each stage of the project and quality of documents produced	Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning, SENAREC, ADB Regional Office and other departments involved, Development	Collecting documents Literature review, Working

EVALUATION MATRIX OF THE DRC PANPURC PPER

TYPE OF QUESTION	EVALUATION QUESTIONS		ASSESSMENT CRITERIA	INFORMATION AND INDICATORS	SOURCES OF INFORMATION	METHODS
	QUESTIONS	SUB-QUESTIONS				
		17.2 To what extent did the Bank play its role in the project post-evaluation period?	Bank commitment	Monitoring by the Bank and preparation of new activities	Partners, PCR and other relevant Government and Bank reports	sessions Interviews
	18. Did management of the project contribute to effective utilisation of the human, financial and material resources of the project	18.1 To what extent was utilisation of the resources consistent with Bank policies and rules?	Evaluation and audit reports and documents	Evaluation and audit findings	Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning, SENAREC, ADB Regional Office and other departments involved, Development Partners, PCR and other relevant Government and Bank reports	Collecting of documents Literature review, Working sessions Interviews
		18.2 Were local organisations and staff prepared for implementation of Bank rules and procedures?	Training in Bank rules and procedures	List of courses and number of persons trained		

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
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







Congo (RDC) - Country Profile



	Congo (RDC)		Afrique Pays en développement		
	Année	Valeur			
Social					
Total Population en milieu d'année (millions)	2008	64.3	985.7	5 523.4	
Taux d'accroissement de la population totale (%)	2008	2.7	2.3	1.4	
Revenu national brut (RNB) par Habitant (\$ EU)	2008	150.0	1 427.9	2 405.0	
Population urbaine (% du total)	2008	34.0	39.1	44.2	
Espérance de vie à la naissance - ensemble (ans)	2008	47.7	54.5	65.7	
Taux de mortalité infantile (pour 1000)	2008	115.3	83.9	53.1	
Taux de malnutrition des enfants de moins de 5 ans	2003	71.0	130.2	80.8	
Accès à l'eau salubre (% de la population)	2007	48.2	68.0	62.0	
Analphabétisme des adultes - Total (%)	38.0	21.0	
Taux brut de scolarisation au primaire (%)					
Garçons	2007	110.0	101.7	112.0	
Filles	2007	101.8	92.1	103.0	
Indice de développement humain	2007	0.601	0.514	0.679	
Indicateurs macroéconomiques					
	1990	2000	2006	2007	2008
PIB (Milliards de dollars E.U.)	9.3	4.3	8.8	10.4	12.6
Croissance du PIB en termes réels (%)	- 6.6	- 6.2	5.6	6.3	6.1
Croissance du PIB par habitant en termes réels (%)	- 9.9	- 8.5	2.6	3.4	3.2
Investissement intérieur brut (% du PIB)	9.1	3.4	13.2	18.2	17.7
Epargne nationale Brute (% du PIB)	5.2	- 0.6	11.1	16.0	6.0
Inflation (%)	...	550.0	13.2	16.7	27.6
Masse monétaire M2, variations annuelles en %	18.4	...	57.5	50.7	55.7
Variation en volume des exportations (mses) (%)	0.1	- 6.1	28.3	75.0	- 3.9
Variation en volume des importations (mses)(%)	- 17.6	38.8	15.0	69.0	15.8
Variation des termes de l'échange (%)	- 12.3	- 4.6	7.5	1.1	45.1
Service de la dette (% des exportations b& s)	37.8	83.6	24.8	9.6	8.4
Solde des comptes courants (% du PIB)	- 7.7	- 4.0	- 2.4	- 1.8	0.3
Dette extérieure totale (% du PIB)	108.6	290.9	122.0	101.0	106.6
Average exchange rate (monnaie nationale par \$ EU)	0.0	21.8	468.3	516.8	559.3
Réserves internationales (Millions de dollars)	261.3	...	154.5	180.7	77.7
Réserves intern. (en mois d'importations des b & s)	1.3	...	0.5	0.3	0.1
Structure de l'Economie					
Par secteur (% du PIB)					
Agriculture	31.0	49.4	42.6	39.8	37.0
Industrie	29.0	20.1	23.9	23.8	23.7
Manufactures	11.3	4.8	5.4	5.3	5.2
Services	40.0	30.6	33.4	36.4	39.3
Par secteur (Croissance annuelle en %)					
Agriculture	2.6	-11.0	4.2	1.4	1.7
Industrie	-18.9	1.0	12.4	9.4	9.6
Manufactures	-14.6	-10.7	11.9	8.9	9.1
Services	1.1	-4.4	9.2	7.6	8.7






Congo (RDC) - Profil pays




	1990	2000	2006	2007	2008
Développement du secteur privé					
Délais pour créer une entreprise (jours)	155	155	155
Transfert de propriété - Temps (jours)	57	57	57
Paiement des taxes - (nombre)	32	32	32
exécution des contrats - Délai (jours)	685	685	645
Indice de protection des investisseurs (0-10)	3.3	3.3	3
Finances publiques (% du PIB)					
Recettes totales et dons	11.7	4.0	20.7	17.5	15.5
Dépenses totales et prêts nets	22.7	8.5	18.1	15.6	16.0
Déficit (-) / Excédent global (+) (y compris dons)	-10.9	-6.0	-0.7	-0.3	-5.8
Balance des paiements					
(Millions de dollars E.U.)					
Balance commerciale	584.5	242.4	9.8	207.8	1 189.2
Exportations de biens (fab)	2 323.1	892.2	2 750.3	4 347.5	5 677.7
Importations de biens (fab)	1 738.5	649.8	2 740.4	4 139.7	4 488.5
Balance des services	-527.8	-167.8	-460.7	-578.1	-973.2
Revenu des facteurs	-742.0	-388.0	-469.7	-415.4	-450.7
Solde des comptes courants	-715.4	-172.7	-212.4	-191.1	32.9
Balance des paiements (% du PIB)					
(Millions de dollars E.U.)					
Balance commerciale	6.3	5.6	0.1	2.0	9.4
Exportations de biens (fab)	24.8	20.6	31.2	41.7	44.9
Importations de biens (fab)	18.6	15.0	31.1	39.7	35.5
Balance des services	-5.6	-3.9	-5.2	-5.5	-7.7
Revenu des facteurs	-7.9	-9.0	-5.3	-4.0	-3.6
Solde des comptes courants	-7.7	-4.0	-2.4	-1.8	0.3
Flux financiers et dette extérieure					
(Millions de dollars E.U.)					
Flux financiers nets totaux	1 409.2	191.8	1 203.1	1 143.8	...
Aide publique au développement nette	895.8	177.1	2 048.9	1 216.5	...
Investissements nets directs en prov. de l'étranger	-14.5	23.4	-116.0	720.0	...
Dette extérieure totale	10 155.0	12 608.6	10 766.9	10 524.2	13 480.9
Service de la dette	37.8	83.6	24.8	9.6	8.4


Balance fiscale (% du PIB)



Balance commerciale (% du PIB)



Solde des comptes courants (% du PIB)



Flux financiers nets totaux (Millions de dollars E.U.)

