• The project is rated relevant and is in line with both the Country’s National Strategies and the Bank’s Country Strategy Paper. At completion, it remains in line with the tenth National Development Plan (NDP10) for the period 2009-2016 to accelerate diversification with the key goals of developing and maintaining reliable infrastructure. Furthermore, the project is in line with one of the proposed pillars as in the Country Strategy Paper 2009-2013, namely the removal of infrastructure bottlenecks to enhance competitiveness and growth

• Nonetheless, the project is rated unsatisfactory regarding Quality at Entry due to two main project design weaknesses. First, the project design was based on the assumption that traffic would flow to the road once it was upgraded from an unpaved road. Second, the design also lacked adequate framework or mechanism to ensure cross border or customs harmonization. It is only four years after project completion, after the project scope change from a highway to a corridor, that the project met its expected impacts.

• The project is rated efficacious since it met its outputs (construction of 221 km of two-lane bitumen road between Sekoma and Mamuno) but did not meet, upon completion, its intended outcomes. Project design conceived the project as a highway project with the objective of promoting regional integration. A 4% traffic growth was anticipated at appraisal. Neither facilitation nor safety measures were conceived to meet this traffic target.

• Long hours at the border posts, limitation on driving hours on the section of the highway, lack of facilities on some sections of the highway and the proximity of people and animals on the road dissuaded road users to use the highway. The unanticipated conversion of the Trans Kgalagadi Highway into a corridor was an essential measure to promote the use of the road and also to enhance regional benefits. The corridor has promoted cross-border trade and traffic as well as economic cooperation between Botswana and Namibia. The implementation of a structured corridor management committee has achieved substantial milestones in terms of customs harmonization.

• The majority of intermediate outcomes were achieved but modest gains were made in terms of improvement of access to social services and the reduction of final cost of goods and services for roadside communities. As far as long term results are concerned, the establishment of the corridor has enhanced regional economic cooperation amongst the SADC Member States of the TKCMC which has been translated by the introduction of the Single Administration Document (SAD 500), the harmonization of axle load limits, the harmonization of border operating hours (7:00 - 24:00) and improved border clearance times (reduction from 2 days to 20-30 minutes with a maximum of 1 hour for commercial traffic).

• As a result of the establishment of the road corridor, the project is rated efficient. The Economic Internal rate of Return (EIRR) was revisited as part of this PPER and amounted to 19.35% which is lower than an estimate of 31.25% in the PCR and 30.60% at appraisal. Both Vehicle operating costs (VOC) and travel time were reduced (VOC reduced by 35.76% and travel time reduced by at least 4 hours as the distance on the TKC between Gauteng and the port of Walvis Bay decreased from 2300km to 1900km), regional access has increased by 50% and the international traffic increased by 60%.

• Regional integration is poorly mentioned in the appraisal and completion reports. Performance indicators to measure some of project outcomes such as the promotion of economic integration and cooperation between involved countries (Botswana, Namibia, South Africa) were lacking. Those mentioned above were identified and calculated by this review.

• The project sustainability is rated unsatisfactory. The project benefits are unlikely to be sustainable for the following reasons: (i) Both the Road Fund and Roads Authority have not been implemented despite the clear recommendation of the Institutional Study of Botswana Road Agencies which was carried out in 1998; (ii) Maintenance allocations are inadequate due to the absence of a sound road maintenance planning, weak institutional capacity, which has resulted into the failure of the concerned agencies to approve budget requests for maintenance. Funding from Central Government has not increased and funds allocated for bush clearing during this financial year have already been exhausted. The maintenance funding shortfall amounts to about Pula 58 million (approximately USD8.4 million). Only about a third is recovered from road users from the fuel tax revenue source. In addition, the lack of accuracy and reliability of traffic counts is likely to hamper robust planning by the RD, especially with respect to the Road Management System Analysis; and (iii) There is staff shortage at the RD (33% of the positions are vacant). There is loss of continuity as the RD has been falling under distinct line ministries with low incentive bonuses and salaries than those offered by the private sector.

• Although the project included TA for the PIU, it seems that the institutional capacity was not robust enough to identify risks and establish appropriate mitigation measures. Also, the use of Force Account Units for routine maintenance reduces the project’s cost effectiveness.

• Road safety is a matter of high concern and with expectations of increased traffic safety issues such as lack of resting stops, risk of collision with cattle are likely to remain in the future.

• The project has provided training for road engineering and planning as well as for environmental services but the capacity to plan, implement, and monitor social aspects of projects is currently insufficient. This is associated with high turnover of professional staff which has affected the implementation of the ESIA Report.

• In terms of environmental impact, some of the recommendations made in the ESIA and the audit report conducted in November 2002 have not been implemented. These pertain specifically to operational aspects and the requirements to promote tourism and job.

• Regarding social development impact, in areas like Ghanzi, the social evils associated with developments such as roads (increased crime, spread of HIV/AIDS, etc.) are increasing. In respect of crime, local government has responded by increasing police patrolling. At the time of construction of the road, HIV/AIDS had not yet been mainstreamed into impact assessments. In order to address the threat of HIV/AIDS, the National AIDS Coordinating Agency (NACA) has been charged to coordinate and facilitate the nation’s HIV/AIDS awareness and preventions programmes in collaboration with the National AIDS Council (NAC) and various stakeholders.

• Overall, the project performance is rated satisfactory. As discussed above, the project is relevant, met its development objectives since it achieved its outputs and outcomes.

• The Borrower performance is rated satisfactory since GoB committed itself to the success of the project by implementing all facilitation measures to meet project objectives as a corridor.

• The Bank performance is rated unsatisfactory. There is no evidence that indicates that the Bank introduced mitigation measures to address project design issues. Although the project has undergone a major design change after completion of physical implementation, the Bank’s PCR failed to acknowledge that the road had been upgraded to a transport corridor due to under-utilization of the road.

• Non-physical barriers to cross-border movement of people and goods between the involved countries in regional road project such as the Trans-Kgalagadi Road Project are of importance and need to be considered in the design of this type of projects.

• Setting up a corridor management team and cross-border arrangements and harmonization procedures prior to loan effectiveness are necessary conditions to ensure stakeholders’ ownership, project coordination and engagement with various stakeholders, and achievement of regional road project goals.

• Appropriate M&E system with key performance indicators to measure regional project objectives such as the promotion of economic integration and cooperation between involved countries, is key to ensure that objectives are met and projects are yielding expected results.

• Strengthening countries’ institutional capacity and providing effective support to the design and monitoring of projects with regional integration focus help assist the countries’ policy makers and executing agencies to enhance their knowledge on regional integration projects and programs and to incorporate lessons learned into project design and implementation. 

• Regular and sufficient funds allocation for road maintenance is a necessary condition to ensure the project sustainability. This allocation must be based on a sound road maintenance planning program.

Recommendation(s) to the Beneficiary:

• Measure to increase road safety through the reduction of the risk of collisions with stray cattle and donkeys can be done though the fencing of cattle posts. The partial fencing of, the road must be monitored, especially during the operational phase to determine the effect ,on wildlife population.

• The recommendation of the Environmental Audit and Review of the Socio-economic Impacts of the TKR must be evaluated and monitored closely. The GOB must act on the outstanding issues.

• As far as Operations and Maintenance (O&M) activities are concerned, it is recommended that the programming of O&M and the approval of funding request should be done not only on the funds that are realistically available but also on the road conditions. Also, the Government while continuing to plan the maintenance works, should encourage the private sector to take over the periodic and routine maintenance works.

• Road maintenance planning should remain within the prerogative of RD but road maintenance works should be done by the private sector. GoB should encourage, competitiveness and give a bigger role to the private sector in the transport and public works, industries, replace force account works in the highway sector, including road maintenance works,, with works by contract;

• The technical and economic viability of establishing the Road Fund and Road Authority should be revisited as a matter of urgency. It is recommended that the Bank in coordination with the Borrower re-initiate the discussion concerning road maintenance revenues. Clear and realistic sources of funding for the maintenance of the road and the entire road network in general should be identified. Also, the Transport Policy should be updated and integrated with other plans on an urgent basis.

• Regarding the institutional capacity at the Roads Directorate, the Borrower should systematically strengthen and/or restore capacity on road engineering, planning and socio environmental safeguards. The Bank could include training components in the future transport operations.

• Future transport operations should include the creation of the Road Fund, capacity building of the Roads Directorate to plan road works, the transfer of road maintenance execution from force account to contractors, and the creation of a Road Agency. This should establish a framework for sustained and efficient road maintenance.

Recommendation(s) to the Bank:

• It is recommended that the design of any project with regional integration focus: (i) includes a component to mitigate non-physical barriers to the cross-border movement of people and goods between the involved countries, (ii) ensures the implementation of facilitation measures, and (iii) implements safety measures to avoid coalition with animals.

• In case the purpose at the outset is to build a transport corridor, it is recommended to set up a corridor management team prior to loan effectiveness to coordinate and engage with various stakeholders in order to ensure the achievement of project goals. The same applies to cross-border arrangements and harmonization procedures.

• It is recommended to ensure: (i) a continuous dialogue after project completion with the country and Executing agencies, and (ii) an appropriate impact assessment of projects with regional integration focus especially when initial objectives are not met.

• The Bank should strengthen country’s institutional capacity and provide effective support to the design and monitoring of projects with regional integration focus by: (i) identifying impact indicators with targeted levels at project completion and beyond; (ii) defining a monitoring system to evaluate the evolution of the project regional integration impacts during its implementation (iii) building a knowledge on regional integration projects and programs experiencing and incorporating lessons in project design, implementation and evaluation; and (iv) reviewing periodically how the countries are implementing regional integration projects and ensuring that they are achieving expected results.