Objective

This evaluation has been designed to examine the application of PBOs used by the Bank over the period 1999–2009

The overarching objective of the evaluation is to examine the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the PBL instrument as used by the Bank in regional member countries over the period 1999 – 2009. Specific attention is being given to the evaluation of: 

a) The AfDB’s institutional and policy framework for the design, appraisal and delivery of PBL: to evaluate the Bank’s formal policy framework, procedures, skills and organisational structure for the delivery of PBL. How well does this reflect emerging international (and Bank) best practice; and is the Bank organisationally equipped to delivery best practice PBL efficiently and effectively? 

b) Policy and practice: to evaluate the Bank’s approach to the design, appraisal and delivery of PBL instruments in practice and how well this fits or deviates from Bank policy guidelines, with international best practice and country context and needs. 

c) Choice of aid instruments: to evaluate how choices are made about the use of aid instrument in the country programmes and how relevant it is to the partner country’s problems, policies and priorities 

d) Effects at country level: To assess the contribution made by the AfDB to policy dialogue, joint processes, institutional strengthening and other relevant areas where PBL is focused.

Main Findings

• Preparation and monitoring of AfDB PBO support has improved and become more participatory .

• AfDB's PBOs have influenced key areas of policy reform and institutional strengthening. AfDB has added value through its support to aid effectiveness, capacity building and through its flexible response to agenda setting and funding

• Merging technical support with PBO funding has strengthened interventions in institutional support and contributes to more effective PBOs

• The opening of the BFFO and the calibre of the staff has made a step difference in terms of the AfDB’s engagement at country level and its capacity to respond, but fundamental constraints in the decentralisation process remain to be addressed

• The predictability of AfDB support is weak and this results in high transaction costs for the Government

• The Bank’s technical capacity for PBO management is excellent but it is insufficient to provide in-depth support on all aspects of BS dialogue and implementation

• PBOs are increasingly important in the Bank’s overall portfolio, and have been strategically used to provide increasingly harmonised aid aligned with the Government’s plans, processes and activities and other DP's inputs

• The AfDB’s chairing of the GBS Group in 2008 provided the platform for the Bank to strategically engage and to strengthen the joint agenda; it also raised the AfDB’s credibility

• Partners have little understanding of the AfDB’s overall strategy, and what role PBO support plays in this respect

• Guidelines on how decisions are made on individual country PBO allocations have become clearer over the evaluation period, but could be further strengthened

• The use of conditionality has been strengthened based on lesson learning, but effectiveness of PBOs is constrained by: the use of AfDB-specific conditionalities, rigid funding instruments, and centralised approval processes

 

Main Recommendations

Recommendation(s) to the Bank:

• Decentralisation of decision making – This country case study illustrates the leading role that AfDB has played at country level in policy reform, institutional strengthening, and aid effectiveness. Lessons from this study include the importance of high calibre staff, a solid understanding of context, the benefits of greater harmonisation with partners, identifying areas of potential added value, clear agenda and priority setting, and the need for good working relations between HQ and the field. Good progress has been made, but there is a need for the AfDB to invest more in strengthening the human resource base that the BFFO has provided at the country level so it can play the greater role it has the potential to play. The AfDB also needs to ensure that decision making is sufficiently decentralised to allow for effective action. Processes between HQ and the field need to be streamlined and adequate incentives need to be created across the organisation for performance on PBOs.

• The BFFO has had a clear agenda for PBO support. For the Bank group, CSP guidance on PBOs needs to be further strengthened to reflect the specific role of PBO in the Burkinabe context. In particular the CSP needs to make explicit how the project and PBO components of the portfolio complement one another and what the long-term vision and expected evolution of the instrument are. This will require reflection and decision- making at country level and also at HQ level, taking into account the findings of these case studies. AfDB as a whole should spell out more clearly its targets and its medium-term vision for PBOs, and how PBL will contribute to the success of the overall AfDB portfolio

• A longer-term more programmatic approach to country-level PBO support would increase the effectiveness of the instrument. Longer time-frames would constitute a more realistic approach to policy and institutional reforms, which require time to be implemented in a context where capacity and structures are weak. A longer-term approach would also be more in line with the approach by other partners and contribute to the overall goals that are being targeted. It would also go some way to addressing the issues identified in this study with respect to conditionalities.

• This country case highlights that AfDB needs to review its procedures and requirements for the disbursement of PBO funding. So that it becomes possible to disburse funding in situations where good (but perhaps not complete) progress has been made and to accommodate unexpected changes in the context (such as the effects of an economic crisis). AfDB should carefully examine the changes that other partners (such as the EC, the WB and a number of bilaterals) have made in recent years and feed these lessons into its ongoing stock-taking of its operations to ensure its own instruments remain efficient, effective and relevant and that they contribute as well as possible to the objective of greater harmonisation

• For the Bank Group: More work needs to be done with other partners to move towards a small set of commonly agreed conditionalities, and away from individual agency-specific conditionalities. This will require changes in terms of HQ policy and practices.

• BFFO has accorded a high level of priority to the role of strong institutions in policy reform. The integration of institutional strengthening and technical support in PBO support in Burkina has provided a workable solution to strengthening ownership and to ensuring that capacity is built and is a best practice from Burkina Faso which should be considered for other countries.

• In Burkina Faso, AfDB has punched above its weight. Nonetheless, the staffing is severely constrained and needs to be reinforced. The current staffing level is putting considerable strain on the existing human resources and is not sustainable.