Cameroon: Evaluation of Bank Group Assistance to the Agriculture and Rural Development Sector, 1996-2004

Date: 26/02/2008
Type: Country strategy and program evaluation
Country(ies): Cameroon
Sector(s): Agriculture & Agro-industry
Status: Completed
Ref.: CA10003

Evaluation Team

This report was prepared by Mr. P.A ROCHON, Principal Evaluation Officer, and Mr. Berté KAMA, Consultant, following a mission to Cameroon from 5 to 23 March 2007. Questions on this report should be referred to Mr. H. RAZAFINDRAMANANA,

Objective

The main objective of this evaluation is to conduct a systematic assessment of Bank assistance to Cameroon's agriculture and rural development sector, in terms of Bank and national strategies and assistance through lending and non-lending operations. This evaluation focuses on the results obtained by the assistance program from 1996 to 2004. With regard to policies and strategies, it draws lessons that could be used in improving future interventions. Its conclusions will supplement similar studies conducted in other sectors, and be taken into account in the evaluation of Bank Group assistance in Cameroon.

Main Findings

  • Cameroon is an agricultural economy and the rural sector, which accounts for 30% of GDP, plays a leading role in the national economy. From 1987 to 1993, the Cameroonian economy suffered a sharp drop in export earnings because of the steady decline in the price of leading exports (oil, coffee, cocoa and cotton) and a fall in the GDP. After a series of successive of macroeconomic stabilization programs, structural reforms and the gradual liberalization of agricultural activities from 1995, economic growth picked up again, at an average annual rate of 4.5%, driven mainly by the development of food crops, manufactured goods and, more recently, the implementation of major road infrastructure projects or the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline project.
     
  • The main constraints on rural sector development are: (i) the low level of training for farmers and the limited number of training facilities; (ii) limited private sector participation; (iii) the insufficiency and poor state of rural infrastructure; (iv) limited access to farm inputs and products; (v) insufficient financing; (vi) seed production and marketing difficulties; (vii) the high incidence of diseases and pests; (viii) limited access to land and land tenure insecurity; (xi) inadequate consideration of the criterion of competence in recruiting management staff for the sector; (x) overcentralization of Government services; and (xi) complex and unwieldy administrative procedures that cause delays and sometimes lead to corruption.
     
  • The Bank’s assistance strategy for the agricultural sector makes a distinction between lending operations, which are fully consistent with the country’s priorities, and non-lending operations. In the first group of operations, the Bank’s options are in line with those of the country. The non-lending aid instruments that have helped to improve the quality of dialogue between the Bank and the country are: (i) Country Strategy Papers (CSPs); (ii) portfolio reviews; (iii) supervision missions; and (iv) participation in various activities (studies, donor committee, etc.). There has been marked improvement in approach, which has become more participatory, with the involvement of the various stakeholders. The Bank’s strategy was relevant.
     
  • Over the period under consideration, the nine reference projects in the study are fully consistent with poverty reduction strategies, as they improve output in the agriculture, stockbreeding, fisheries and forestry sub-sectors. An analysis of the various logical frameworks shows that sector objectives can be summed up into two points, as follows: (i) the improvement of incomes; and (ii) the promotion of food security in project areas. These objectives feature among Cameroon’s agriculture and rural development priorities (NAP, RSDS). They are consistent with the Bank’s goal of promoting sustainable economic growth and reducing poverty in Africa, mainly by investing in rural development.
     
  • However, project implementation has encountered enormous difficulties generated mainly by the Borrower. The sanctions imposed on the country and on projects for various shortcomings have led the Bank to extend nearly all its projects. Recurrent disbursement problems can be attributed to the Bank.
     
  • Despite the sheer size of the portfolio, and due to various reformulations and suspensions, the impact of the projects on the sector is not yet perceptible, except in research which has been revitalized thanks to the Bank.

Main Lessons

  • The inconsistency in sector interventions (registration, or otherwise, in successive ADFs) reflects a rather short- and medium-term view of interventions. The issue of the duration of the CSP period is therefore pertinent.
  • The recurrent problem of disbursements at the Bank cited by the Borrower as one of the bottlenecks to project implementation reflects the inadequacy of the new measures adopted by the Bank. The extension of deadlines could also be attributed to the technical department responsible for project files. Task managers do not have enough prerogatives in project monitoring.
  • Large-scale projects (in a wide geographical area) without an adequate management mechanism have little chance of achieving satisfactory results because of implementation and supervision difficulties.
  • The inadequate involvement of Ministerial services in project management could undermine the sustainability of institutional development.
  • Projects with a high number of components have little chance of producing satisfactory results; the same applies to projects with very few components.
  • The search for cofinancing could enhance dialogue between partners and speed up the harmonization process.
     
  • The negative impacts of agricultural sector liberalization (export crops) have led farmers to revert to food crop cultivation, which has enormous processing potential. However, the weak link in the system remains the lack of storage and marketing infrastructure.
     
  • IRAD is an institution that enjoys sub-regional renown. Supporting its activities could reinforce sub-regional integration.
     
  • The SP-SFSP obtained results that can promote regional integration.
     
  • The inadequate formal dialogue between the Government and the private sector does not facilitate access to agricultural financing, and consequently does not promote the development of the sector.
     
  • Limited access to local financing is a constraint on the sustainability of project outputs.

Main Recommendations

Recommendations to the Bank:

  • With regard to the harmonization of assistance, the Bank needs to address the issue of CSP periodicity by adopting a longer term vision.
  • Give priority to projects with a reduced number of components over a smaller geographical area.
  • Give more decision-making powers to task managers in order to improve communication between the Bank and the PIUs.
  • Initiate studies to identify viable sub-sectors of the agricultural private sector or use the existing project databanks (RSDS, NEPAD). The MTEF has identified projects to be financed that could revitalize the sector. Support could be given to programs that promote the competitiveness of agricultural products and the development of professional farmer organizations. Supporting the development of agricultural credit and contributing to the creation of specialized financial establishment are actions that could contribute to the development of economic activities in rural areas. The Bank’s strategy of giving priority to infrastructures under the current CSP could promote the development of agricultural markets that generate private sector growth.
  • Prospect for possibilities of co-financing sub-regional projects (agricultural research, food security). The FAO pilots the sub-regional food security program. The Bank needs to participate in the consolidation of the pilot phase (SP-SFSP). The Bank launched an identification study for the Agricultural Research Regional Integration Project (PIRRA). Considering IRAD’s achievements, this institution could be retained as the benchmark structure in the implementation of this project.

Recommendation(s) to the Beneficiary

  • Establish a resource mobilization strategy that will lead to timely availability of counterpart funds;
  • Give priority to the sector during implementation of the donor-supported “Governance” program.
  • Create the conditions for sustained dialogue with the agricultural private sector in order to develop the existing potential.
  • Promote the development of the seed producer profession in rural areas.
     
  • Encourage sub-regional project development initiatives in the areas of research and food security.
  • Encourage the development of microfinance in Cameroon’s rural areas for the agriculture and rural development sector.