Evaluation Team

This report was prepared by Mr. P.A ROCHON, Principal Evaluation Officer, and Mr Mathias SANOU, Consultant, following a mission to Cameroon from 12 to 30 March 2007. Questions on the report should be referred to Mr. H. RAZAFINDRAMANANA

Objective

The purpose of evaluating Bank assistance to the social sector in Cameroon is to examine the consistency of the Bank’s policy and strategies in the sector with those defined by the Cameroonian authorities. The evaluation also aims to analyse the extent to which the Bank’s interventions in the social sector in Cameroon have achieved the objectives defined in the Country Strategy Papers (CSP). The evaluation also seeks to analyse the extent to which the resources provided were effectively used to achieve the set objectives. The evaluation principle is to identify and explain the causes and origins of the outputs of Bank assistance, its strengths and weaknesses, and to draw lessons. Lastly, the conclusions of this sector evaluation report will be used in evaluating assistance to the country.

Main Lessons

• The absence of a genuine long-term dialogue on clear and coherent sectoral strategic objectives did not allow the Bank to intervene more easily in the social sector (education, health and poverty reduction) in Cameroon. Consequently, there is lack of synergy between the CSPs and rigour in the programming of aid. Thus, the Bank had to abandon poverty reduction in urban areas in favour of assistance to reproductive health which was not initially programmed. It also abandoned basic education in favour of technical and vocational education, and then discontinued its financing in education.

• Adherence to financing instruments, such as sectoral budget support, remains primarily theoretical for Cameroon because, in practice, the Bank, like other development partners, continues to intervene mainly at the level of projects. In fact, governance problems do not yet allow for this method of intervention in the country. Indeed, the deterioration of governance in general and public finance management, particularly between 2002 and 2004, was not conducive to the strengthening of the “harmonization” process. In this respect, the utilization of interim HIPC resources revealed weaknesses which dissuaded donors from granting sectoral budget support.

• The “harmonization” of aid places the recipient country at the core of the process (“alignment”), and goes beyond consultation or coordination among donors. It is not limited to “the harmonization” of procedures for granting aid or to the practice of co-financing. In Cameroon, the harmonization process did not make significant progress until 2005. Inadequate inter-Ministerial coordination remained a weak point in the ownership of policy dialogue with partners.

• The Government is facing difficulties in fulfilling conditions precedent to the effectiveness of loans: the average time frame is 16.6 months for projects in the social sector (against 6 months required by the Bank). Difficulties related to the fulfilment of conditions were compounded when they required strong support from the Government and enactment of regulations.

• The Bank gave value added to its assistance by implementing a pilot experiment in the form of a study-action, which helped to reduce the repeater rate to 8% at the end of the experiment compared to 40% at the beginning, whereas the Government and other partners in the sector simply advocated the enactment of regulations to stop this phenomenon.
   
• The 2005-2009 strategy did not provide for assistance to the social sector. Nevertheless, a premature halting of Bank assistance jeopardizes prospects of building on and disseminating the outputs of the pilot experiment on the reduction of the repeater rate conducted successfully in primary education

• The strategies proposed by the Bank concerning part-time training, credit system, decentralization and autonomy of training institutions are major innovations in the existing system. However, since the Government has not yet taken a decision on these different options through an appropriate sectoral policy, the basis of Bank assistance in technical and vocational education is not sufficiently solid.

• The fluctuation of the exchange rate of the UA against the CFAF hampered the smooth conduct of activities while increasing their costs. The Government succeeded in maintaining the quantitative objectives in primary education, by offsetting the significant shortage of resources due to exchange losses with HIPC and PIB funds.
   
• In ten years of cooperation, none of the health infrastructures financed under Bank assistance is operating. The Bank has not yet really contributed to the country’s progress towards the achievement of the MDGs. This poor performance is due to the fact that the Bank wanted to build on the experience acquired by the PIU by systematically moving it from one project to another, without an appropriate evaluation of its capacities, and that it took two years to recruit a firm for architectural and engineering designs.
   
• The populations were not sufficiently involved in the choice of sites for health infrastructures. The change of the site of new buildings to host the AYOS Hospital, for example, resulted in additional costs, which blocked the works.
   
• Concerning poverty reduction in Cameroon, the Bank made little effort, in terms of analytical works, to have a broader vision so as to address the most structural aspects of poverty. In this area also, it did not have adequate field experience concerning the mechanisms and means required for reaching the poor in the country. Consequently, it sometimes embraced too many sectors and activities at the same time when selecting the targeted poverty reduction actions.
   
• When activities proposed by the Bank at appraisal are not sufficiently clear and explicit, this subsequently hampers their smooth implementation. The “school sites programme”, for example, was not properly implemented because the concept was not sufficiently understood and the appraisal report did not describe its feasibility in detail.
   
• The lack of consultations with beneficiaries led to an overestimation of the capacity of communities to mobilize personal contributions fixed at 20%, whereas they could bear only 10%.
   
• The appreciation of the UA against the CFAF was not conducive to the achievement of some quantitative objectives. For example, the Government reduced by nearly one half the number of line kilometres of rural roads to be rehabilitated, as well as the quality of structures. Probable currency fluctuations and its effets on projects cost may be take in consideration during project design for more robust costing.
   
• The mechanisms for financing recurrent costs are not suitable enough for ensuring the viability of Bank financing. Regulations provide for a financial allocation to assist in the functioning of school boards and maintenance of schools. Although inadequate, the funds hardly reach the grassroots. Consequently, these structures are unable to ensure maintenance of the school infrastructures.

Main Recommendations

Recommendations to the Beneficiary:

• Revise the 2005-2009 strategy concerning the social sector, taking into consideration the rejuvenation of the portfolio, the priority still accorded the sector and the fragility of achievements regarding the MDGs, the limited resources of the State, and the need to build on and disseminate the outputs of the pilot experiment successfully conducted in primary education

• Assist the Government in putting in place a specific sectoral strategy on technical and vocational education so as to provide a more solid foundation for Bank assistance and that of other partners in this area

• Engage dialogue with the Government to include in the Public Investment Budget (PIB) the funds required for the maintenance of school infrastructures constructed with Bank financing

• In order to assist the country in making progress towards achievement of the MDGs, the Bank should ensure greater efficacy in carrying out activities, in particular those relating to the construction and equipment of health facilities, so as to enable the beneficiary populations, particularly women, to benefit from them as soon as possible

• Avoid the systematic moving of PIUs from one project to another, and institute a contractual mechanism based on the evaluation of the performance of project teams and the achievement of results

• Considering the increasingly important role played by the beneficiary populations in the operation and maintenance of schools and basic health care facilities, the Government and the Bank should ensure that all stakeholders are effectively involved in the design of projects so as to take into account their real capacity to participate

Recommendations to the Bank:

• Engage genuine long-term dialogue on clear and coherent sectoral strategic objectives in the area of poverty reduction based on better knowledge of the sector (including ESS), MDGs and the PRSP

• Assist the country in establishing an appropriate information system that would meet the needs of regularly producing and analyzing relevant indicators for monitoring and evaluating the PRSP and MDGs

• Design operations that are simpler, less ambitious and easier to implement, focused on well-targeted areas and based on the country’s managerial capacity and skills, and clearly define performance and impact indicators in the project matrix

• In order to build on the experience gained on the ground and for future Bank operations in Cameroon and in other RMCs, particularly in the area of poverty reduction, the Bank (OPEV Department) should conduct a review of all the “poverty reduction” projects

• Continue to provide support to the Government to enable it to implement its good governance strategy, so as to eventually grant sectoral budget support to strengthen the aid “harmonization” process which places the recipient country at the core of the process

• Diversify and strengthen the complementarity between intervention instruments by effectively combining lending and non-lending operations, particularly analytical studies, technical assistance and institutional support

• Assign to the Yaounde Regional Office and the Country Team the appropriate human and financial resources required for the conduct of analytical works and preparation of projects

• The Cameroon Government should give significant impetus to the strengthening of its cooperation with the Bank, in particular the management and monitoring of operations

• Avoid the multiplicity of loan conditions by strengthening dialogue on those that are realistic, relevant and necessary for the achievement of project objectives

• Incorporate the risks related to exchange losses in appraisal reports and seek consensus on a mechanism for mitigating their impacts so as not to jeopardize the achievement of quantitative objectives of projects

• Reduce the rigidity of the Bank through effective decentralization of activities and delegation of the necessary authority to the Yaounde Regional Office