Evaluation Team

OPEV Management

Rakesh Nangia, Director, OPEV

Franck Marie Perrault, Acting Director (at the time of evaluation)

Mohamed Hedi Mohamed, Division Manager, Project and Programme Evaluation, OPEV.1

Odile Keller, Division Manager, High Level Evaluations, OPEV.2

Objective

In terms of outcomes, the project was expected to: (i) increase the domestic wastewater treatment capacity of the Cambérène Treatment Plant; (ii) increase the domestic wastewater pumping capacity in the serviced plots (Parcelles Assainies) neighbourhood; (ii) promote the adoption of good hygiene and sanitation practices; (iv) build ONAS’ organizational capacity; (v) enhance wastewater treatment by-products (wastewater, sludge and methane gas); (vi) improve the quality of water discharged into the sea; (vii) reduce the incidence of diseases caused by poor hygiene and sanitation; and (viii) build ONAS’ operational capacity.

Main Findings

• The project is considered to be relevant insofar as its objectives and components are fully in line with Government’s priorities in the drinking water supply and sanitation sector; it is a continuation of the Long-term Water Sector Programme (which is the cornerstone of the sector’s long-term strategy. The project addresses a real need of the inhabitants of Dakar and its environs who are faced with serious sanitation problems. It is also consistent with the Bank’s strategy for Senegal (1999-2001) which seeks to strengthen social facilities in urban and periurban areas under the “infrastructure” pillar. The city of Dakar has huge constantly changing sanitation needs

• On the contrary, quality at entry assessment is deemed to be unsatisfactory owing to: (i) inadequate consideration of constraints related to the treatment process retained (activated sludge) in the Dakar context.; (ii) validation by the Bank of a partial and sub-optimal solution to address financial constraints; and (iii) the failure to consider past lessons on the inclusion of stormwater and other solid waste.

• In addition, the design eclipsed the problem posed by the existing sewage outfall1 with substandard hydraulic characteristics and unguaranteed durability. It was also limited to the restructuring of the existing sanitation network without any extension to facilitate household connection. Lastly, the ex ante evaluation underestimated the project cost and no genuine environmental and social impact assessment was carried out.

• Concerning physical outputs, out of the two new units with a wastewater treatment capacity of 10 000 m3 /d each (that is 20 000 m3 /d in total), the project was able to build only an incomplete unit (without a sludge system) with a capacity of 11 300 m3 /d. Overall, the project has helped to increase the secondary treatment capacity of the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant from 5 700 m3 /d to only 17 000 m3 /d due to a drastic reduction in the volume of work initially planned for this component. However, the project has significantly improved the wastewater pumping system of the serviced plots neighbourhood (comprising 26 units) by restructuring the network and building the capacity of the pumping system (rehabilitation of five plants and construction of four others), thus increasing the volume of wastewater discharged through the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant.

• Concerning functionality, the engineering structures and facilities built in the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant under the project are functioning normally. In contrast, some of the pre-treatment facilities built in 20042 are out of order and are said to be3 under rehabilitation. At the time of the mission, the plant was temporarily shut down closed due to heavy rain in Dakar which flooded the plant, particularly the power station which is the heart of the system.

• All the hydraulic and electromechanical equipment of the wastewater pumping system in the serviced plots is operational, albeit with a few recurrent breakdowns. The metallic equipment (composed mainly of generators and surge tanks) has been damaged owing to exposure to ocean currents. Overall, frequent power cuts impede the smooth functioning of all project engineering structures, although their negative impact is mitigated by the use of generators installed in each plant.

• Due to the inadequate treatment capacity of the plant in relation to the volume of wastewater entering it, part of the pre-treated effluent (by-pass) is rerouted. The excess sludge and purified effluent, which cannot be treated, is eliminated. This is a result of failure to construct a third treatment system which seriously undermines the plant’s efficiency. . Given the mixture of treated water with by-passed water, the level of raw wastewater discharged directly into the sea and the lack of enhancement of wastewater treatment by-products, the project falls within a system whose existing discharge does meet environmental quality standards. The situation is exacerbated by failure to resolve the problem of the sea outfall as the existing discharge is much too close to the shore to protect the coastline from pollution. Given the technical and energy requirements of activated sludge systems and their extreme sensitivity to variations in the flow rate and load as well as the low level of investment in relation to the scope of needs, this poor performance was more or less predictable.

• Beneficiaries’ behaviour and attitude towards infrastructure, which have not changed significantly despite the implementation of various IEC activities which are still ephemeral, also hamper project efficacy. Consequently, the project’s contribution to the improvement of the social, sanitary and environmental conditions of the target population remains limited. On the whole, the achievement of project objectives and outcomes (efficacy) is deemed to be unsatisfactory.

• As regards efficiency, the project’s economic benefits have been limited by: (i) the reduction in the anticipated physical outputs; (ii) the poor performance of the biological treatment of the Cambérène Wastewater Treatment Plant 4 ; and (iii) inadequate enhancement of treatment by-products. The sub-sector’s incapacity to generate sufficient resources to refinance its activities has adversely affected the project’s financial viability. Indeed, the fees collected through users’ water bills and government subsidies are not enough to cover ONAS’ operating expenses which increase in tandem with investments made. Like the plant, the project is considered to be inefficient.

• The project has helped to initiate the building of organizational, technical and financial capacity and strengthening of internal communication. However, the government has not fulfilled the condition of the loan agreement regarding the increase of the sanitation levy, as ONAS continues to depend mainly on operating subsidies to maintain a fragile balance of annual income statements. At sector level, the project had no major impact on planning, implementation and monitoring capacity. On the whole, the project’s impact on institutional development is deemed to be unsatisfactory.

• The sustainability of project outcomes cannot be guaranteed for several reasons, namely: (i) ONAS’ weak financial and material capacity given that the government has not met its commitments contained in the performance contract concluded with ONAS; (ii) unpredictable power cuts which oblige ONAS to use emergency power generators which are costly but essential; (iii) difficulties in supplying fuel due to ONAS’ financial problems; and (iv) the project’s negative environmental impact. For the moment, the Government does not seem to show a genuine commitment to improve ONAS’ worrisome situation, although discussions are ongoing to find lasting solutions. The political agenda (2012 presidential election) was likely to prolong the situation.

• The overall project performance is deemed to be unsatisfactory.

Main Lessons

• The emergence of a public-private partnership in the sanitation sector requires an institutional framework that promotes: (i) the financial equilibrium of the entity responsible for the technical, commercial and financial management of sanitation services; (ii) the existence of a State-owned company that helps to mobilize the funds needed to develop the sector and manage investment contracts.

• The adoption of a strategy for the development and efficient reuse of sanitation by-products (treated wastewater, sludge and biogas) which is effectively implemented is necessary for ensuring the efficiency of a treatment plant.

• The adoption of a holistic approach through the inclusion of stormwater and solid waste in a wastewater treatment project will provide more comprehensive solutions to problems of liquid sanitation and insalubrity.

• The systematic mainstreaming of Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs) in sanitation projects, particularly those concerning wastewater treatment plants is more useful than an inefficient environmental categorization strategy.

• The uncontrolled profound modification of a project’s scope may result in the use of sub-optimal solutions that adversely affect its efficiency.

Main Recommendations

To the Senegalese Government:

• Adopt a programme approach: the Government should, on the basis of the new Dakar Master Plan which is being finalized, go beyond an ad hoc management of sanitation projects by adopting a coordinated multi-donor programme approach in order to find solutions to Dakar’s chronic solid and liquid waste management problems

• Build ONAS’ financial capacity: the Government should build ONAS’ financial capacity by: (i) increasing the sanitation levy based on a new tariff schedule that is effectively applied; (ii) ensuring the rigorous management of unpaid bills, particularly those of government services; and (iii) looking for other sustainable sources of funding to improve ONAS’ self-financing capacity.

• Strengthen the sanitation sector in Senegal: the Government should envisage the institutional restructuring of ONAS into: (i) a State-owned company responsible for the direct mobilization of funds needed to develop the sub-sector and manage investment contracts; and (ii) an operating company responsible solely for technical, commercial and financial management of sanitation services.

• Revise regulations: the Government should ensure compliance with the regulations applicable to the operation of wastewater treatment plants (quality of treated wastewater) for discharge on land and river environments and amend the regulations on the discharge of treated wastewater into the sea by setting a quality target for the natural environment that would guide the choice of technical treatment arrangements.

To ONAS:

• Formulate a strategy for the development and reuse of by-products: ONAS should define a genuine strategy for the development and efficient reuse of wastewater treatment by-products.

• Improve the efficiency of the Cambérène wastewater treatment plant: ONAS should: (i) upgrade the sludge system to limit the discharge of sludge with treated effluent; (ii) protect the plant against the risk of flooding5 ; (iii) restore existing pre-treatment equipment; (iv) carry on construction work to install the new sea outfall as the existing one is too close to the beaches; and (iv) secure funding to install the third treatment system within the framework of a comprehensive Dakar City Sanitation Programme.

• Ensure environmental protection: ONAS should systematically conduct, in parallel with technical studies, ESIAs and ensure the holding of public consultations to present projects as well as their environmental impacts and mitigation measures (environmental management plans).

To the Bank:

• Ensure quality at entry assessment: during project preparation, the Bank should ensure the availability of key design studies and the technological options retained for better cost estimation and reduction of implementation time frames that undermine the outcomes of infrastructure projects. Exhaustive and quality feasibility studies could necessitate funding by trust funds and should include monitoring and evaluation, gender and environmental aspects as well as the participation of beneficiaries. Furthermore, past lessons should be effectively considered.

• Modify the project: where financing is inadequate, the Bank should allow major project modification only after assessing the impact of such modification with respect to initial project objectives; otherwise, the Bank should ensure the availability of additional financing to fill the gap.

• Adopt the programme approach: the Bank should orient any new action related to the sanitation of Dakar City within the framework of a comprehensive programme that includes wastewater, stormwater and solid waste, in conjunction with other financial partners.

• Mainstream the conduct of environmental and social impact assessments in sanitation projects: given the intrinsic nature of sanitation projects, particularly those concerning wastewater treatment plants, the Bank should systematically demand the conduct of environmental and social impact assessments with environmental management plans including the resources needed for their implementation.