Evaluation Team

This report was prepared by Mr. A. COKER (a.coker@afdb.org), Principal Evaluation Officer, Operations Evaluation Department, (OPEV). It benefited from the leadership of Mr. M. H. MANAÏ, Chief Evaluation Officer, OPEV, on the mission to Kenya and his subsequent inputs. Any further matters relating to the report may be referred to Mr. D. A. BARNETT, Acting Director, OPEV, on extension 2041 or to Mr. COKER, on extension 3425.

Objective

The overall objective of the EIRP was to restore vital socio-economic infrastructure in order to counteract the effects of the “El Nino” on the adversely affected population groups in Kenya. The Methodology of Project Design and Evaluation (MPDE) matrix is presented in Annex 1 and it details the project goals, objectives, outputs and activities. The main purpose of the project was to support the Government’s efforts to mitigate the serious effects of flooding attributed to the El Nino phenomenon on the road and water sectors. In the road sector, the long term goal is to improve the efficiency of road transport systems in the country. In the water sector the long term goal is to provide water supply of good quality in sufficient quantity and in close proximity to the Kenyan populace. The project was deemed to have been a close fit for the long term goals in the sectors by ensuring

Main Findings

• The EIRP was a ‘qualified’ success with various components that provide a baseline for future disaster relief as well as infrastructure projects in the roads and water sectors. The EIRP was thus a wake up call to cope with rehabilitation, disaster and emergency situations. The EIRP was relevant to the country situation and the Bank’s assistance strategy. It has achieved  all its relevant objectives of rendering back to normality the majority of the devastated infrastructure. The EIRP has also positively impacted the socioeconomic conditions of the affected population and provided the basis for more sustainable operations and maintenance within the new institutional framework in the roads and water sectors that has subsequently been implemented by GOK after the project.

• Even though the performances of the parties (GOK, Bank and Co-financiers) were satisfactory in providing timely and adequate response to the country needs in an emergency situation, there were coordination and flexibility issues that may need to be addressed in similar future operations. The Bank could have been more active in playing its advisory role in limiting the burden of the GOK which has increased its contribution by 8% to the project and also in using the remaining balance of the loan. The continued sustainability of the rehabilitated infrastructure remains the negative issue in an otherwise successful project. Action on the ground would need to be strengthened by the GOK even as the new strategies and departments enhance their operations in the sectors but particularly the roads sector.

Main Lessons

• The high level commitment of the Government of Kenya to the El Nino Disaster and subsequent PMU situated in the President’s office is an indication of how disaster rehabilitation projects should be handled in the absence of adequate country policies, procedures and systems. However, it must be noted that stable institutions and good leadership are prerequisites to better management of emergency rehabilitation programs.

• The use of the Banks standard lending instrument and their attendant procurement, disbursement and implementation policies is not suitable for rehabilitation projects after an emergency disaster for which time is of the essence. The achievement of high rates of compliance was incompatible in some instances with the emergency nature of the project

• The use of private firms for financial and technical quarterly audits ensures the streamlining or adjustment of procurement and payment procedures without sacrificing proper oversight of the expenditure of public funds

• Streamlined procurement and payment procedures, and sound public service contract management are necessary for a smooth implementation of an infrastructure rehabilitation project. They are easily replicable in other disaster or emergency situations

• The prompt responsiveness of donors, both IDA and the Bank Group, is an indication of how disaster relief rehabilitation should be approached.

• Adequate recognition of Country and potential project risks is essential to a reduction in implementation delays.

• The active participation of communities during the implementation stages of post-disaster rehabilitation projects is a prerequisite for projects such as the EIRP

• Unrealistic disbursement deadlines and lack of coordination of such deadlines with cofinanciers could create opportunity for the underutilisation of project funds.

• Sustainability of rehabilitated disaster facilities is an issue which should be resolved upfront with adequate transitional arrangements for the rehabilitated facilities. For example, local authorities signed over the completion certificates and are paying their maintenance needs for those roads through the RMLF mechanism

Main Recommendations

Recommendation(s) to the Beneficiary:

• Sector reforms, Disaster policy and improvement and effectiveness of GOK organisations involved in emergency operations should take into account the sustainability issue surrounding rehabilitated facilities.

• The high calibre of experts assembled in the PMU and PSC but drawn from line ministries and put outside the organisational structure of GOK (President’s Office) is not to be ‘ordinarily’ replicated. It may be suitable only in cases of emergencies or evidence of mismanagement in public service delivery.

Recommendation(s) to the Bank:

• The Bank needs to develop an alternative project design with flexible rules and implementation policies that would fall between the current emergency policy and the standard lending instrument for projects such as the rehabilitation of facilities after a disaster

• The use of quarterly or bi-annual technical, financial and management audits was very productive and useful for this project. As such, the Bank should consider putting this in place for all projects financed in RMCs.

• For construction projects, the Bank should ensure that Project Management Units (PMUs) are structured with adequate technical staff to check, verify and challenge the technical consultants if any, on documentation and accuracy of conditions at project sites. This will help avoid changes in project scope and minimize project variations.

• Efforts should be made for disbursement timelines to be more realistic to the Country situations in order to avoid large numbers of extensions on bank financed projects, especially when co-financiers are involved

• The Bank should do all it can to facilitate the establishment of M&E functions at different levels (sector or line ministry, Central Disaster agency, local authorities, etc) in country in order for real-time tracking of achieved results and potential effects of the project on the communities and institutions.

• The conclusions and lessons from the EIRP and ENEP should be considered for application on rehabilitation projects in Fragile States.