Evaluation Team

This report was prepared by a team comprising Messrs. Joseph MOUANDA, Evaluation Officer, and Mourad LABIDI, Consultant, under the supervision of Mr. Mohamed H. MANAI, Manager, Project and Programme Evaluation Division, after a mission they conducted to the Republic of Equatorial Guinea from 6 to 14 November 2009. Questions on the report should be referred to Mr. M.H. MANAI (m.manai@afdb.org )or Mr. J. MOUANDA (j.mouanda@afdb.org)

Objective

The overall objective of AMPDE is to build Government’s capacity in macro-economic management. The specific objectives are to: (i) strengthen MPDE’s investment programming and project monitoring/evaluation capacity; (ii) continue the economic planning activity and improve its methodological approach; (iii) improve the capacity to produce and process statistical data; (iv) sustainably endow MPDE with minimum national skills to discharge its missions; and (v) improve the effectiveness and performance of Bank projects. The expected outcomes (in terms of improvement) are: (i) investment programming and project monitoring/evaluation at MPDE; (ii) economic planning and methodological approach; (iii) production and processing of statistical data; (iv) sustainably endowed MPDE with national skills; and (v) effectiveness and performance of Bank projects. AMPDE was among operations implemented at the time in REG, including a Structural Adjustment Loan (1992), a Poverty Reduction Project (1993) and a Project to Strengthen Basic Health Services (1998). No other project was approved by the Bank until 2008.

Main Findings

• Completed nine years behind schedule, the overall performance of the AMPDE Project is highly unsatisfactory. The project did not achieve the expected output of building national capacity in investment programming, project monitoring/evaluation, economic planning, statistics and improving the performance of Bank projects. This very low capacity was improved outside the project, thanks mainly to the efforts deployed by the Government, with the support of development partners.
• On-going investment programming was marked by a Public Investment Programme (PIP) and development projects of inadequate quality. Economic policy and planning activities are unsatisfactory to date, while the EG 2020 National Development Strategy is yet to be implemented. Institutional statistics capacity remains inadequate and serious weaknesses persist in the system: retrospective economic accounts unavailable since 1992, 2002 population census data contested, unsatisfactory transparency and dissemination of statistics, and absence of a national statistics development strategy. This unsatisfactory performance stems mainly from the weak human resources of the country and MPDE, and unsatisfactory governance at the project level.
• The project’s technical assistance needs were not precisely defined. The terms of reference of experts were not precise and too broad, given the limited time assigned them, in a context of seriously inadequate participation of national colleagues and the absence of a knowledge transfer mechanism. Experts recruited by the project did not perform to MPDE’s satisfaction. Thus, MPDE drew no benefit from the support.
• Training, which was the main component of the project, was a failure. Training plans were prepared but were never implemented, barring four workshops between 1995 and 1997. Weak knowledge transfer considerably limited the sustainability of outputs. The project did not succeed in endowing MPDE with minimum national skills. MPDE staff and their quality have not improved since the nineties.
• The project’s unsatisfactory management due to bad governance, a weak institutional framework, insufficient human resources and its managers’ lack of training on Bank procedures should have pushed the Bank to close the operation by the end of the nineties.
• Thanks to high oil production, Equatorial Guinea moved from being a low income country in the early nineties to today’s middle-income country status, struggling with inadequate human development. Although needs in terms of building capacity to manage the national economy continue to be huge, they could be financed using more domestic and external resources. However, if the prevailing risk during project implementation is not adequately addressed, the Bank’s current and future actions will not bring about the desired changes in the country’s economic management capacity.

Main Lessons

• Analysis and adaptation of capacity-building actions to the implementation context is key to ensuring their success and achieving conclusive outcomes. Similarly, an inadequate assessment of country needs and cursory analysis of institutional and political risk factors may lead to the adoption of an inadequate capacity-building project. 
• Building national capacity to improve macro-economic management effectiveness through training activities is not an adequate response to enhancing the efficiency of management mechanisms in place. Other actions having to do with improving economic governance and retaining qualified executives in Government departments (salary grades and incentives, institutional governance) should also be considered. 
• The effectiveness of technical assistance when implementing a macro-economic management capacity-building project depends on the availability of competent national counterparts and the existence of adequate skills transfer mechanisms for ownership of macro-economic management tools. 

 

Main Recommendations

Recommendation(s) to the Beneficiary:

• Intensify capacity-building in national economy management based on an identification of real needs, considering the thrusts of the EG 2020 strategy and REG’s new socio-economic context as an oil-producing MIC with a low human development level; 
• Improve economic and financial governance of development projects and create conditions for sound project management through adequate operation of the institutional framework agreed with the Bank, compliance with procurement procedures and appropriate accounting in each project. 
• Initiate adequate human resource development policies nationally and in the civil service, including an effective remuneration/incentives scheme and career development system, accompanied with medium-term capacity-building programmes. 
• Consider economic management capacity-building as a national priority that must be mainstreamed in development programmes and projects initiated with or without development partners. 

Recommendation(s) to the Bank:

• In collaboration with other development partners, support the country by financing capacity-building projects of REG’s administrative departments in economic and financial governance, investments programming, planning and statistics (assistance in designing the national statistics development strategy).
• Carefully identify governance problems during the management of capacity-building projects and set up an adequate institutional framework with the Government of REG, while complying with the guidelines of good governance and ownership of capacity-building operations.
• Design operational Bank guidelines in line with the new capacity-building policy/strategy, inspired by best practices of multilateral development banks.
• Insert in all capacity-building operations conditions for transferring skills to national counterparts, while supporting the installation of a system for monitoring/evaluating these operations within the country.
• Ensure the strict application of Bank operational guidelines which set forth conditions for closing a project and cancelling a grant or loan